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VIRTUE,  FREEDOM,  AND  THE  FIRST  AMENDMENT
Marc O. DeGirolami*
“Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot.”1
ABSTRACT
The modern First Amendment embodies the idea of freedom as a fundamental good of con-
temporary American society.  The First Amendment protects and promotes everybody’s freedom of
thought, belief, speech, and religious exercise as basic goods—as given ends of American political
and moral life.  It does not protect these freedoms for the sake of promoting any particular vision
of the virtuous society.  It is neutral on that score, setting limits only in those rare cases when the
exercise of a First Amendment freedom exacts an intolerable social cost.
Something like this collection of views constitutes the conventional account of the First
Amendment.  This Article offers it two challenges.  First, the development of the First Amendment
over the past century suggests that freedom is not an American sociopolitical end.  It is a
means—a gateway out of one kind of political and legal culture and into another with its own
distinctive virtues and vices.  Freedom is not a social solution but instead gives rise to a social
problem—the problem of how to allocate a resource in civically responsible ways, so as to limit
freedom’s hurtful potential and to make citizens worthy of the freedoms they are granted.  Only a
somewhat virtuous society can sustain a regime of political liberty without collapsing, as a soci-
ety, altogether.  Thus the First Amendment of the conventional account has not maximized free-
dom for all people and groups.  It has promoted a distinctive set of views about the virtuous legal
and political society.
Second, the new legal culture promoted and entrenched by the conventional account is
increasingly finding that account uncongenial.  In fact, the conventional account is positively
harmful to its continued flourishing.  That is because the new legal culture’s core values are not
the First Amendment freedoms themselves, but the particular conceptions of political and social
equality and individual dignity that the conventional account has facilitated and promoted.
Proponents of the new legal culture in consequence now argue for aggressive limits on First
Amendment freedoms.
© 2016 Marc O. DeGirolami.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor, St. John’s University School of Law.  Thanks to Samuel Bray, Patrick
Deneen, Richard Garnett, Paul Horwitz, John Inazu, Edward Mechmann, Michael
Moreland, Mark Movsesian, James Oleske, Jeremy Rabkin, Steven Smith, Steven Shiffrin,
Lee Strang, Judge Richard Sullivan, and Adam White.  This Article has benefited from a
presentation at Notre Dame Law School and the generous and probing questions of the
audience.
1 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 393 (Henry Reeve trans., Century
Co. 1898).
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One prominent group has invented a new legal category: “enumerated rights Lochnerism.”
These scholars denigrate any First Amendment resistance to multiplying forms of expansive gov-
ernment regulation in the service of egalitarian aims as retrogressively libertarian.  Another
group argues for novel limits on the First Amendment in the form of balancing tests that would
restrict speech that injures the dignity of listeners and religious exercise that results in vaguely
defined and vaguely delimited harms to third parties.  What unites these critics is the desire to
swell features of the Court’s post–New Deal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and particu-
larly the law concerning sex as a civil right, by protecting progressively expansive conceptions of
equality and individual dignity.  The critics see the conventional account of the First Amend-
ment as an obstacle in the path of progress.
Part I of this Article presents the conventional account of the First Amendment in three
theses.  It then critiques the conventional account in Part II by offering three revised theses,
developed through the somewhat unusual route of exploring the First Amendment thought of the
late political theorist and constitutional scholar, Walter Berns.  Freedom, for Berns, gave rise to a
problem—the problem of making men sufficiently virtuous to merit their freedom.  It was a prob-
lem that he thought had been ignored or even forgotten by defenders of the conventional account
of the First Amendment.
But the problem of virtue and freedom has been remembered.  Part III argues that contempo-
rary defenders of the new legal culture have remembered the problem just as their own cultural
and legal mores are ascendant.  The new civic virtues—exemplified in multiplying anti-discrimi-
nation regulations for the protection of thickening conceptions of equality and individual dig-
nity, particularly as those concepts relate to sexual autonomy—are those that were fostered by the
conventional account of the First Amendment in tandem with significant components of the
Supreme Court’s post–New Deal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  And those civic virtues
are already informing new criticisms of the conventional account and arguments about new
limitations on the scope of religious freedom and freedom of speech.  Berns’s arguments about
freedom and virtue, it turns out, are highly relevant today since progressive opinion is no longer
committed to First Amendment “absolutism.”
The Article concludes with two speculations.  First, it seems we are no longer arguing about
whether to restrict freedom, but for what ends.  If that is true, then those arguments should
neither begin nor end with egalitarian and sexual-libertarian fervor.  Second, there is no account
of the First Amendment that maximizes freedom for everyone—for all persons and groups.  There
is only the society that America was before the rise of the conventional account of the First Amend-
ment and the society that it is becoming after it.
INTRODUCTION
The modern First Amendment symbolizes the triumph of freedom.  It
embodies the idea of freedom as a fundamental and self-evident good of con-
temporary American society, one so obvious as to need little defense.  At the
level of legal doctrine, the Supreme Court has only occasionally doubted the
expansive protections of religious freedom2 and freedom of speech that it
has found in the First Amendment over the last century.3  At the level of
2 The situation of religious free exercise is somewhat complicated. See infra notes
86–102 and accompanying text.
3 This Article concentrates on these freedoms in particular because the doctrine
interpreting them is more developed than that of the other First Amendment freedoms of
petition and assembly.  For an important recent study of the latter, see JOHN D. INAZU,
LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012).
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ideas, the contest between communitarian or virtue-promoting views and lib-
ertarian views of the purposes of the First Amendment is widely believed to
have been decided conclusively in favor of the latter.  The First Amendment
protects and promotes every individual’s freedom of thought, belief, speech,
and religious exercise as basic goods—as given ends of American political
and moral life.  It does not protect these freedoms for the sake of promoting
any particular vision of the virtuous society.  It is neutral on that score, setting
limits only in those relatively rare cases when the exercise of a First Amend-
ment freedom exacts an intolerably high social cost.
Something like this collection of views constitutes the conventional
account of the First Amendment.  Some may contest or quibble with certain
of its details—indeed, some have4—but it is serviceable as a general state-
ment of the prevailing understanding of the First Amendment’s purposes
and functions.  The conventional account of the First Amendment has had
profound effects not only on American law and politics but also worldwide,
providing the foundation for new and revised accounts of religious and
expressive freedom in international secular and religious documents.  Some
of those effects have been beneficial; others have not.  This Article largely
avoids these evaluative issues and instead offers two challenges to the prem-
ises of the conventional account.
First, the development of the First Amendment over the past century
suggests—against the conventional account—that freedom is not an Ameri-
can sociopolitical end.  It is a means—a gateway out of one kind of political
and legal culture and into another with its own distinctive virtues and vices.
To put it another way, freedom (How much? What kind?) is not a social
solution but instead gives rise to a social problem—the problem of how to
allocate a resource in civically responsible and healthful ways, so as to limit
freedom’s hurtful potential and to make citizens worthy of the freedoms they
are granted.  Only a somewhat virtuous society can sustain a regime of politi-
cal liberty without collapsing as a society altogether.  Freedom, as Tocqueville
said, cannot govern without faith.5
The particular responses to the problem of virtue and freedom offered
by the Supreme Court over the last hundred years have helped to shape—
and transform—American society.6  There is therefore no contest between
the communitarian or virtue-promoting and the libertarian views of freedom
under the First Amendment.  Contestation requires rivalry, but these are not
rival perspectives about freedom at all.  Rather, the supposed triumph of the
libertarian First Amendment, in combination with the broad expansion of
the American regulatory state and the ever-hardening political commitment
to equality as the preeminent constitutional value of our time, has steered
American law away from one set of political commitments and toward
4 See infra Part II.
5 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
6 Of course, legal doctrines, and Supreme Court opinions in specific, are only one
catalyst of social and political change.  By focusing on law, this Article does not deny or
minimize the role of other catalysts.  Still, law and the Court have played their part.
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another.  The First Amendment of the conventional account has not maxi-
mized freedom for all people and groups.  It has instead promoted a new set
of views and dispositions about the nature of the virtuous legal and political
society.
Second, as it becomes entrenched, the new legal culture is increasingly
finding the conventional account of the First Amendment uncongenial.  It
no longer needs that account to achieve its most important aims.  Even more,
the conventional account is positively harmful to its continued flourishing.
That is because the new legal culture’s core values are not the First Amend-
ment freedoms themselves (in this it resembles the legal culture that pre-
ceded it) but the particular conceptions of political and social equality and
individual dignity that the conventional account has facilitated and even
intentionally promoted.  Proponents of the new legal culture in consequence
have argued for aggressive new limits on First Amendment freedoms.
One newly prominent group has invented an entirely novel legal cate-
gory: “enumerated rights Lochnerism.”  These scholars denigrate any First
Amendment resistance to multiplying forms of expansive government regula-
tion in the service of egalitarian aims as retrogressively libertarian.  Another
group argues for novel limits on the First Amendment.  In the religion clause
context, for example, they claim that religious accommodations are unconsti-
tutional whenever they impose “substantial” or “material” “harms” on third
parties, including vaguely defined and vaguely delimited harms to individual
“dignity.”  In the Speech Clause context, they advocate new balancing tests in
which speech would be measured against values implicating the dignity of
listeners and broader social interests.  And they champion the regulation of
“revenge pornography” (but not pornography proper) and, especially, corpo-
rate speech while retaining maximum liberty for speech that is perceived to
promote or be consistent with their favored ends.  What unites these critics is
the desire to swell features of the Court’s post–New Deal Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and particularly the law concerning sex as a civil right,
by protecting progressively expansive conceptions of equality and individual
dignity.  These are the virtues of the new legal culture.  The critics see the
conventional account of the First Amendment as an obstacle in the path of
progress.
Part I of this Article elaborates on the doctrinal and theoretical features
of the conventional account of the First Amendment that has dominated its
interpretation through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  It presents
the conventional account in three theses.  The Article then critiques the con-
ventional account in Part II by offering three revised theses—not so much
point-by-point refutations of the conventional account as disagreements with
some of its basic premises.  The Article develops these criticisms through the
somewhat unusual route of exploring the First Amendment thought of the
late political theorist and constitutional scholar, Walter Berns.  Berns
believed that the First Amendment must be interpreted and applied so as to
promote the virtuous society and that the interpretations given it by the twen-
tieth-century Supreme Court were deeply in error.  Freedom, for Berns, gave
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rise to a problem for any society that had reflected seriously about the rela-
tionship of the state and society.  The problem was that of making men suffi-
ciently virtuous to merit their freedom.  It was a problem that he thought had
been ignored or even forgotten by the defenders of the conventional account
of the First Amendment.
But the problem of virtue and freedom has been remembered.  Part III
of this Article argues that the virtue-promoting function of the First Amend-
ment is alive and well.  Contemporary defenders of the new legal culture
have remembered the problem (if it ever had truly been forgotten) just as
their own cultural mores are ascendant.  The new civic virtues—exemplified
in multiplying anti-discrimination regulations for the protection of thicken-
ing conceptions of equality and individual dignity, particularly as those con-
cepts relate to sexual autonomy—are those that were fostered and facilitated
by the conventional account of the First Amendment in tandem with signifi-
cant components of the Supreme Court’s post–New Deal Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.  And those new civic virtues are already informing
criticisms of the conventional account and arguments about new limitations
on the scope of religious freedom and freedom of speech—arguments that
vindicate Berns’s view that the First Amendment’s function must be to incul-
cate distinctive political virtues.  Indeed, Berns’s arguments about freedom
and virtue are not less relevant today, but more so, since progressive opinion
is no longer committed to First Amendment “absolutism.”  Thus far, the
Supreme Court has largely rejected the critics’ arguments; but if it were faith-
ful to the First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that it has devel-
oped over the last century, perhaps it should accept them.
The Article concludes with two brief speculations.  First, it appears that
we are no longer arguing about whether to restrict freedom, but for what
ends.  If that is true, then those arguments should not begin and end with
egalitarian and sexual libertarian fervor.  Second, there is no purely liberta-
rian First Amendment, no account of it that maximizes freedom for every-
one—for all persons and groups.  There is only the society that America was
before the rise of the conventional account of the First Amendment and the
society that it is becoming after it.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The conventional account of the First Amendment will be familiar in its
broad outlines to most observers of American law.  Indeed, the ideas com-
prising it are so widely held as to seem nearly platitudinous.
A. The Core Purpose of the First Amendment Is to Protect and Promote Freedom of
Religion and Speech as Intrinsic Goods of American Political and
Moral Life.
The text of the First Amendment speaks of the “free” exercise of religion
and the “freedom” of speech, but it does not explain why these freedoms
merit special legal protection and what political or social purposes they serve.
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Those explanations have been generated over the span of the life of the
republic.  At times theorists have simply claimed that the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment are so self-evidently good—so fundamentally a part
of the American political landscape—as to need no justification at all, as to
be a kind of inborn or native American preference.  The eminent historian
Daniel Boorstin, for example, once wrote that First Amendment freedom is
part of the givenness of the American polity,7 and the political scientist Louis
Hartz argued that “the ‘great advantage’ of the American lay in the fact that
he did not have ‘to endure a democratic revolution,’” being born free with-
out having to become free.8  A recent essay by Professor James Oleske simi-
larly suggests that the value and limit of religious freedom is simply one of
those “ingrained instincts” common to right-thinking, ordinary Americans.9
When justifications for special constitutional protection for free speech
and religious freedom are offered, three recur most commonly.10  The first
concerns the necessary conditions of liberal democratic government.  As to
speech, “[l]iberal democracies,” as Kent Greenawalt has observed, “have a
great need for free discourse about public affairs.”11  Because liberal democ-
racies depend for their survival on the choices of their citizens, it is believed
that a citizenry whose speech is unrestrained becomes more informed, which
in turn makes for an improved popular government.12  Moreover, liberty of
expression is necessary in order to call any liberal democratic government
deserving the name to public account for abusive conduct, as well as to deter
future misconduct.13  Religious freedom is likewise a fundamental condition
of liberal democratic government because, as writers since James Madison
have observed, it demarcates the limits of such a government’s legitimate
scope, constraining the government’s rightful purposes (and narrowing the
social harms it ought to correct).14  To be morally legitimate, a liberal demo-
7 DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 138–39 (1953).
8  LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 35 (1955). The allusion here is
to Tocqueville, who wrote that Americans were “born equal, instead of becoming so.”  2
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 123.
9 James M. Oleske, Jr., Doric Columns Are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes, the Ministerial
Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV. 142, 143 (2015).
10 There are others, of course.  Both in the speech and religion context, freedom is
seen as a tool for promoting civic peace, for example.  That justification could be regarded
as independent or part of the political justification.
11 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF
SPEECH 6 (1995).
12 Lee Bollinger once argued that free speech promotes civic tolerance. See LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA
(1986).  This, too, is a function that focuses on the civic or political benefits of unre-
strained speech.
13 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521.
14 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 51, 51 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2011) (“We
maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution
of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”); RALPH KETCHAM,
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cratic government must take this limited form.  It must abstain from lawmak-
ing that reflects any opinion as to religious truth, for these are matters
beyond its proper ken.15  And yet, the capacity of Americans freely to hold
religious opinions was thought by Tocqueville to be foundational for the
health of the civic polity.16  This central justification for the freedom of
speech extends back before the American Revolution to the Letters of Cato:
“This sacred privilege is so essential to free governments, that the security of
property and the freedom of speech always go together . . . . Whoever would
overthrow the liberty of a nation, must begin by subduing the freedom of
speech.”17  It highlights the instrumental relationship of liberty of speech
and religion in producing a healthy, integrated civil and political commu-
nity—“the liberty of the nation” as the political liberty of “the People.”
The second justification trades on the Millian idea of rivalry among ideas
as an avenue to truth,18 or what Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to as “free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”19  Louis Brandeis’s
renowned aphorism that the “remedy” for “falsehoods and fallacies” is “more
speech” is to like effect.20  The strongest arguments in the end win out only
in a kind of survival of the fittest where people are at maximum liberty to
choose and rechoose the most rational or the most persuasive.  Truth, includ-
ing ethical and political truth, is approached fitfully but by steady advance in
a kind of unending progression of insight, critique, and correction.21  First
FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION 99–100 (1993)
(“Madison’s original phrasing of what became the First Amendment further revealed his
preoccupation with the public rather than the personal or private character of the five
freedoms . . . . [T]he emphasis on not abridging civil rights, rights related to government,
and on not having a national religion has clear reference to the ‘good health’ of the
processes of government.  These religious rights, that is, are necessary to conduct the pub-
lic business freely and fairly as well as to protect individual liberty of conscience.”).
15 See generally PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITU-
TION (2011).
16 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 387–88.
17 1 JOHN TRENCHARD, CATO’S LETTERS 97–98 (1724).
18 JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 3, 35
(2002) (“No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his
first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead.  Truth gains more even
by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the
true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to
think.”).
19 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The remedy for
speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the ordinary course in a free society.  The
response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the
straight-out lie, the simple truth.” (citing Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377)).
21 See Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, 35 POL. STUD. 410, 414
(1987) (describing “[t]he most important” of Mill’s arguments in favor of individual free-
dom of thought, discussion, and lifestyle as “based on the desirability of what I am going to
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Amendment freedom is therefore conducive to grasping true ideas, or at
least less false ideas, as errors are most efficaciously exposed when everybody
enjoys a maximum freedom to speak.
The American conception of religious liberty trades on a related founda-
tional idea—what sociologist Grace Davie has referred to as the “market-
place” model of religion.22  In the United States, religious groups splinter
and diversify the better to suit the felt desires of existing and prospective
adherents.  They compete with one another as service providers or private
firms would, with the consumer selecting the religion that best corresponds
to his present circumstances.  The consumer changes his associational affilia-
tions accordingly.23  What is “true” in this model is, as William James once
had it, what most closely accords with “genuine happiness”: “If a creed makes
a man feel happy, he almost inevitably adopts it.  Such a belief ought to be
true; therefore it is true.”24  The Jamesian view of religion and its relation-
ship to truth has had a powerful influence on the Supreme Court; indeed, it
has been explicitly cited by at least one Supreme Court Justice for the pro-
position that a jury cannot distinguish sincerity of religious belief from relig-
ious truth.25  Religious freedom thus assumes a highly voluntarist
character.26  The untrammeled freedom of individual choice-making and
choice-changing is the primary object of legal protection because what is
“true” depends not on the achievement and retention of a superior religious
insight (an insight that the government would, in any case, be prevented
from embracing by the Establishment Clause) but on the process of choice-
making and changing in response to ever-altering circumstances and desires.
The third arch-justification focuses on the importance of expressive and
religious freedom for individual identity.  Its power has greatly increased
since the mid-twentieth century.27  Some have described the first two justifi-
cations as consequentialist, while this one is not, but that division is contesta-
refer to as ethical confrontation—the open clash between earnestly-held ideals and opinions
about the nature and basis of the good life”).
22 GRACE DAVIE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 12 (2d ed. 2007).
23 Id.
24 WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE
78–79 (12th ed. 1906).
25 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92–93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I do
not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is
believable.  The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show that they
have been true in his experience.”).
26 Some of the most eloquent defenses of religious freedom in the United States begin
from explicitly voluntarist premises. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revis-
ited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 51 (2007); see also Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be
Protected as Equality?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1211–15 (2007) (defending Douglas Laycock’s
understanding of substantive neutrality).
27 One of the historical progenitors of the individualist justification may be found in
what David Rabban has called “prewar libertarian radicals,” who “viewed free speech as one
of a connected set of fundamental rights to personal autonomy.” DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 14 (1997).
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ble.28  Freedom of religion and speech require special protection because
religious exercise and verbal expression go to the essence of what it means to
be a human person.  They are, as Justice Stone once put it in dissent in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, “but guaranties of freedom of the human
mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express
them.”29  The freedom to communicate one’s speech, including one’s
speech about religion, is a sine qua non of human flourishing, protecting not
only the development of human thought but also the self-realization or self-
actualization of the speaker.  Thus, these First Amendment freedoms are in
some way intrinsically valuable simply because they are inextricably con-
nected with the human dignity of the autonomous person: “An autonomous
person cannot accept without independent consideration the judgment of
others as to what he should believe or what he should do.”30  This iden-
titarian justification also relates closely to an egalitarian undercurrent: we
treat people unequally unless we recognize and respect the beliefs, as mani-
fested in their speech and their religious practice, that go to the core of their
persons—their real or authentic selves.
This third justification is canonical for the conventional account of the
First Amendment.  It is reflected in what one casebook refers to with the
umbrella term, “individual-centered theories” of the First Amendment,31 the-
ories that have achieved special prominence and centrality in the later twenti-
eth century.  Indeed, the other two core justifications—the civic and the
truth-seeking—are increasingly subsumed or recharacterized within the iden-
titarian or individualist justification.  American political or civic cohesion
more and more is not manifested in any shared set of substantive convictions
of the people as a community (community convictions that might be fortified
by free speech and free religious exercise) so much as in an allegiance to
individual freedom itself—the freedom of the individual to speak, believe,
and exercise religion as he wills.  Very little that is permanent binds the Peo-
ple other than the conviction that very little that is permanent binds it.  Like-
wise, it is truth as the individual perceives it, and as his subjective perceptions
change about it, that is the object of speech and religious freedom protec-
tion, not truth as a separate reality from individual belief.
It is this personal, interior justification for freedom that has permeated
the international secular and religious community as well.  The European
28 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 48 (1982) (“In
contrast to this social side of individual interests, both this chapter and the next focus on
freedom of speech as an individual interest in a narrower (and stronger) sense.  Here the
ultimate point of reference is the individual, not the state, or society at large.”).  Some
writers describe the interest in personal “autonomy” served by this function in consequen-
tialist terms, see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119,
143–45 (1989), but this points to the difficulty of separating cleanly consequentialist from
non-consequentialist justifications.
29 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
30 Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 216
(1972).
31 1 VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 832–967 (2006).
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Convention on Human Rights, for example, speaks of a universal “human”
right to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” as well as to “freedom
of expression.”32  Likewise, though the Catholic Church’s ontology of human
dignity is rather distinct from that of secular Western nations,33 the influence
of this third justification has been felt in conciliar and post-conciliar Catholi-
cism, as when Pope Paul VI (influenced by the American Jesuit intellectual
John Courtney Murray) emphasized the connection between religious free-
dom and human dignity: “This demand for freedom in human society chiefly
regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit.  It regards, in the
first place, the free exercise of religion in society.”34
What unites all three justifications is the underlying view that freedom of
speech and religious exercise is the fundamental premise of the political,
intellectual, and moral life of American society—so fundamental as in some
way to vindicate or at least excuse the view that First Amendment freedom
needs no defense at all.  The connective tissue of free speech and free relig-
ious exercise holds together the American polity—constitutes its deepest
essence.  Good is written “good” and bad is written “bad,” to denote the sub-
jectivity of judgment that is believed to attend them.  But freedom, of speech
or religion, is never written “freedom.”
B. In Achieving the First Amendment’s Core Purpose, the American State Remains
Neutral as to Any Particular View of the Virtuous Life.
The conventional account’s second thesis is that the state is forbidden
from expressing any value preferences when it comes either to speech or
religion.  It is non-preferentialist and non-prescriptivist on both counts.  The
notion that there are some ideas that are supportive and nurturing of the
political community and some that are debilitating and unhealthy is rejected:
all ideas are equally public-minded, all equally part of the firmament of the
common political community, all equally orthodox insofar as the state is con-
cerned.  Justice Jackson’s famous line from Barnette has itself become the
Polaris of this general view: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”35
The point is not only about official compulsion to speak, believe, or
behave in certain ways, or to refrain from doing so.  It also concerns the
32 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 9–10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
33 On this point, see Mark L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1517 (2016).
34 Paul VI, Declaration Dignitatis Humanae para. 1 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://
www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_196512
07_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.  The influence of American ideas of freedom on the Cath-
olic Church’s position on religious freedom is remarked in JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLI-
CISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2003).
35 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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American state’s own outlook or worldview about the content of speech and
religious exercise.  That worldview is neutral.  It gives no official support of
any kind to virtuous views and no official sanction against vicious ones, for
the First Amendment requires that there be no authority on what is “ortho-
dox” in “matters of opinion.”  Heterodoxy of opinion is not only tolerated
but also fostered; it is the commitment to protecting heterodoxy of opinion,
and the commitment against official prescription or preference for any opin-
ion, that binds the American people together as a political community.
Professions and defenses of neutrality as a core feature of the First
Amendment are legion in the doctrinal and academic literature.  Perhaps
the best known in the speech context is the rule that any restriction on
speech must be “content neutral,” a regulation whose object may not be the
control (understood in the broadest possible terms) of the communicative
content of the speech and whose genesis may not lie in disagreement with
the substance of a particular message or idea.36  Non-content-neutral regula-
tions are presumptively unconstitutional and trigger the Court’s highest scru-
tiny.37  The fact that the content of speech may cause offense, no matter how
grave, never is by itself an adequate reason to deprive it of constitutional
protection.38  More than this, the Court has gone out of its way to underline
that “the point” of free speech is to “shield” misguided and hurtful speech
from any differential treatment by the state.39  “Content-neutral” “time,
place, and manner” restrictions are permissible, and certain categories of
speech—at one time, speech that constituted a “clear and present danger” of
bringing about certain “substantive evils,”40 and today, speech that threatens
physical harm, incites imminent illegal activity,41 is maliciously defamatory, is
“obscen[e],”42 constitutes “fighting words,”43 is of “purely private concern,”44
and a few others—may be regulated because of its content.  But the former
do not target content, while regulations of the latter may be distinguished
36 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1975).
37 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
38 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
39 Id. at 412–16.
40 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
41 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  For an earlier and less
expansive speech test along the same lines, see Masses Public Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1917) (“One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands.
Words . . . which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude
of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government
in a democratic state.”).
42 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
43 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
44 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2490 (2011); see also Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).  The category “matter[s] of public concern” covers lots of
ground, however: any speech that might “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community,” id., or that might be “a subject of
legitimate news interest” or “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public” is of public concern, San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004).
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from the ordinary case of expression as “performative” or “situation-altering
utterances,” speech that is not simply an assertion of fact or value but an
action.45  They may also be distinguished simply as exacting too high a social
cost to be tolerated.
Communications nearly universally regarded as odious, vicious, disgust-
ing, cruel, and depraved, however, are not of this sort.  They stand on equal
footing, insofar as the state is concerned, with all other speech.  Official neu-
trality toward (and not merely toleration of) such speech is “the price we pay”
for a free society.46  Yet the fee is readily forfeited.  The state’s attitude of
neutrality extends well beyond questions of prohibition, requirement, tolera-
tion, or even degrees of differential treatment.  Noxious speech merits equal-
ity of treatment with salubrious speech; indeed, official judgments about
noxiousness and salubriousness are forbidden.  They are out of bounds for
the political community.  They are within the jurisdiction of the individual
alone.  The state must remain as neutral about speech defiling the memory
of a dead soldier with accompanying rants about homosexuality,47 or visual
expression depicting sadistic-fetishistic torture and dismemberment of ani-
mals,48 or the “ethnic cleansing [of] . . . African-Americans, Latinos, or
Jews,”49 as it is toward any other.  “God hates fags” may be less “refined” than
“God loves you” but the ideas within the expression—the values that stand
behind the words—are perfectly equal from the state’s perspective, for the
state must, in the main, confine its regulation to concerns other than con-
tent.50  It is in fact instructive that the Court distinguishes the quality of these
phrases in terms of “refinement,” inasmuch as it introduces a populist, class
oriented, egalitarian theme.  The Court thereby democratizes speech—levels
it as indiscriminately valid in its substance—as the state’s neutrality toward
ideas comes to imply its belief in their equality: “[O]ne man’s vulgarity is
another’s lyric.”51
Even speech that is a lie—and known to be a lie about an easily verifiable
fact, “an intended, undoubted lie”—must be treated equally with speech that
is true.52  The Court not only guards against the possibility that the govern-
ment might draw untoward distinctions between falsehood and truth in ways
45 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 58 (1989).
46 Frederick Schauer has questioned how much “we” as a society (as distinguished
from discrete victims) pay for odious speech. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1355 (1992).
47 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
48 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).  The Court in Stevens held that a
federal statute criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty for profit was unconstitutionally
overbroad. Id. at 482.  This notwithstanding Justice Alito’s view that the statute had a “sub-
stantial core of constitutionally permissible applications.” Id. at 489–91 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
49 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2750 (2011).
50 Phelps, 562 U.S. at 454.
51 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
52 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (plurality opinion).  The
Court in Alvarez distinguished lies per se, which receive full constitutional protection, from
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that might chill speech about complex and contested philosophical, aes-
thetic, political, and religious questions; it fears any such official distinction
whatsoever, no matter the context, as portending the worst of tyrannical
nightmares.53  In one of the Court’s more recent forays into content-neutral-
ity, Justice Thomas held for the Court that any differentiation not only as to
content proper, but also as to categories of speech (regulations, for example,
of signage size that distinguish between political speech and speech offering
directions to an event) as well as speaker is presumptively unconstitutional
because it is non-neutral, the purposes of such regulations
notwithstanding.54
Neutrality has long been a basic staple of religion clause jurisprudence
as well, for both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  Neutral laws—
laws that do not target religious belief and practice for selective discrimina-
tory treatment—and that apply generally do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.55  Indeed, “non-neutral” laws are, after the Smith decision, ostensibly
the only kind that implicate constitutional free exercise concerns.56  Unequal
application of the law is similarly objectionable because it is evidence that the
law is in practice “targeting” or discriminating against religion notwithstand-
ing its facial neutrality.
Likewise, from the very beginnings of the modern account of the Estab-
lishment Clause, neutrality has always occupied a central place: it “requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers.”57  Various tests of neutrality have over time superseded the
older secularist-separationist test of Lemon v. Kurtzman58 as the Court’s
favored approach to Establishment Clause cases concerning government
funding questions as well as state-sponsored displays of religious symbols.  In
the area of funding, the Court has stated that “government programs that
neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without refer-
ence to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge.”59  As in the speech context, it has also emphasized the connection
lies associated with specific legal claims such as defamation, fraud, and perjury, which may
not. Id. at 2544–45.
53 Id. at 2547 (“Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need
Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.” (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949))).
54 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).  The Court cast considerable
doubt on the continuing vitality of the “secondary effects” test, which subjects a regulation
to lesser scrutiny if its predominate object is not disagreement with the message but con-
trol over “secondary effects” associated with the speech. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
55 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–82 (1990).
56 “General application” is a proxy for a type of neutrality: laws that apply only selec-
tively are suspected of non-neutral motivation and/or enforcement.  In other work, I ques-
tion just how firmly the rule of neutrality has been applied by lower courts. See MARC O.
DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 147–66 (2013).
57 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
58 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971).
59 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993).
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between neutrality and individual or autonomous choice—between the neu-
trality of a government mechanism for distributing money indirectly to relig-
ious institutions (via a voucher system, for example) and the existence of
“genuine and independent private choice” on the part of the individual
financial beneficiary as to the uses of those moneys.60
The permissibility of the state’s display or use of religious words or sym-
bols is governed by the so-called “non-endorsement” test, first articulated in a
concurrence by Justice O’Connor in a case involving the display of “a Santa
Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas
tree, carolers, cut-out figures representing such characters as a clown, an ele-
phant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that
reads ‘SEASONS GREETINGS,’ and the cre`che” in the local shopping dis-
trict of a Rhode Island municipality.61  The test asks whether a “reasonable
observer” of these kinds of pastiches would perceive that the state was thereby
endorsing or disparaging religion in such a way as to convey a message of
unequal membership or unequal status in the political community to that
observer.62  The word “neutrality” does not appear in the test, but percep-
tions of state neutrality are the key to satisfying it.  The state’s position on
religious symbolism must be neutral from the perspective of the individual
reasonable observer’s eyes—neither endorsing nor disparaging—thereby
communicating the equal political status of ostensible “outsiders.”  The state
must convey the message to reasonable individuals that it stands above and
apart from partisanship in religious symbolism, and that it views all religious
words and symbols as perfectly equal.
Neutrality as to the substance of speech and religion, and its various con-
sociations with equality and individual choice, is thus a mainstay of the con-
ventional account of the First Amendment.  It is a fundamental premise of
the dominant approach to free speech and it has been said by one prominent
academic exponent to “work[ ] well as a master concept in the theory of the
religion clauses.”63
C. The Supreme Court Has Achieved the Core Purpose of the First Amendment by
“Autonomizing” It—Maximizing Freedom at the Level of and for the
Sake of Individuals.
If the core purpose of First Amendment freedom is to protect and pro-
mote freedom of speech and religion as intrinsic goods of American public
life, while remaining neutral as to the nature of the virtuous life, the
Supreme Court has fulfilled that purpose by progressively, and with only a
few exceptions, maximizing freedom at the level—and for the sake—of indi-
60 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
61 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
62 Id. at 690–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
63 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 4–5 (2013).  Even
those academic proponents of neutrality whose ambitions for it are less lofty place it at the
center of their theories of religious freedom. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 26.
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viduals.  That process, which this Article calls the “autonomization” of the
First Amendment, has been one of the Supreme Court’s primary jurispru-
dential projects in this area over the last half century.
As to freedom of speech, the Court’s decisions evince its belief that the
core purpose of the First Amendment is best attained through a broad read-
ing of the Speech Clause that expands expressive freedom for individuals,
not groups.  As Justice Thomas has put it, “part of the Constitution—the First
Amendment—does enact a distinctively individualistic notion of ‘the free-
dom of speech,’ and Congress may not simply collectivize that aspect of our
society, regardless of what it may do elsewhere.”64  And Justice Thomas’s view
of the core “notion” underlying the protection of speech is only a relatively
late expression of the increasing power of what was previously discussed as
the third justification for First Amendment freedom—its capacity to fulfill or
realize individual human identity or human dignity.65
A seminal case in the Speech Clause’s autonomization is Cohen v. Califor-
nia, which concerned criminal charges of disturbing the peace against a per-
son wearing a jacket with the phrase, “Fuck the Draft,” in a local
courthouse.66  In finding that Cohen’s speech rights were violated, the Court
emphasized that protection for speech extends not only to “cognitive” but to
“emotive” expression as well.  The notion that Cohen’s speech truly was
healthy for the community—was a core example of the type of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment—was not emphasized by the Court.  This was
perfectly sensible: Cohen’s speech neither was intended nor was remotely
likely to occasion “open debate” or public deliberation about the merits of
the Vietnam War.  It was intended to shock, and it did so, though its embrace
by the Supreme Court may have thwarted Cohen’s own shocking intentions
for it.  Justice Harlan’s majority opinion therefore highlighted not the pro-
motion of public debate itself, but that the “necessary side-effects” of public
debate include “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance,” the
last of which was meant to characterize Cohen’s own expression.67  The func-
tions of Cohen’s protected speech—emotional, personal, implicating matters
of “taste and style”—were assigned entirely to the realm of individual choice.
As such, they are matters as to which the political community, as a commu-
nity, has no legitimate judgment to offer.  Indeed, the very fact that the
speech was expressed through a personal article of clothing highlights its
branding, identity-marking function.  Public expression, as Joseph Raz once
put it, is “itself an element of several styles of life,” and freedom of speech
serves the function of validating those individual lifestyles, helping to cement
the individual’s identification with his chosen lifestyle and opening up to
64 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 506 n.3 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
65 See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
66 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
67 Id. at 24–25.
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other individuals the possibility of selecting that lifestyle.68  Lack of such offi-
cial validation through the mechanism of free expression is a concomitant
affront to the individual dignity of the chooser—an insult and a repudiation
of his way of life, and so of himself.69
The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed the ascendancy of
autonomized free speech protection.  Speech that is “outrageous,”70 that
offends the “dignity” of the hearer,71 that is both used and perceived as a
weapon of “aggression and personal assault,”72 that depicts “cruelty” and is
sexually arousing because of the torture it inflicts,73 that is personally abusive
and intended to “inflict great pain”74—all of these go well beyond incendiary
or bracing speech intended to elicit robust debate on a controversial matter
of public concern and relate crucially to interests of various sorts in individ-
ual identity-formation and realization.  That is because the First Amend-
ment’s “fundamental rule of protection,” the Court has held, is “that a
speaker has the autonomy to choose . . . his own message.”75  Or, as Seana
Shiffrin has argued, free speech protects the right of each particular
“thinker” to become “a distinctive individual,” “[r]espond[ ] authentically,”
and fulfill her “interest in being recognized by other agents for the person
she is.”76  To be sure, certain categories of speech continue to receive protec-
tion on the basis of non-autonomizing justifications.  Commercial speech is
an example, which the Court has held receives protection, comparatively lim-
ited though it may be,77 because of the “informational function” that it
serves.78  And other more sizable categories of speech might not be easily
justifiable through an autonomy-based rationale.79  But many of the Court’s
major contributions to free speech protection of the mid-late twentieth cen-
68 Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303,
310 (1991).
69 Censorship is only the most extreme form of non-validation.  Any differential treat-
ment might trigger claims of non-validation.
70 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
71 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).
72 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
73 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465–66 (2010).  The Court held that the
statute at issue was overbroad, refusing to remand to the lower court to determine whether
the statute survived constitutional scrutiny as applied to crush videos. Id. at 481–82.
74 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011).
75 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995).
76 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283, 289–90 (2011); see also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 251, 254 (2011) (emphasizing the purpose of free speech as protecting the
speaker’s “authority (or right) to make decisions about herself”).
77 United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).
78 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
79 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Speech Restrictions That Don’t Much Affect the Autonomy of
Speakers, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 347, 351 (2011) (emphasizing “listener interests” in the work
of the dead).
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tury have flown under the banner of autonomization, and it stands to reason
that the Court has thereby greatly expanded the freedom of speech.
A similar movement toward autonomization can be seen in the progress
of free speech theory.  The great speech theorist, Alexander Meiklejohn,
wrote nearly eighty years ago that the “model” of First Amendment free
speech was the town meeting, in which “the people of a community assemble
to discuss and to act upon matters of public interest” and accept procedural
and substantive abridgements on their speech to fulfill the very purposes of
free speech.80  The town meeting, he continued, “is not a Hyde Park.  It is a
parliament or congress. . . . It is not a dialectical free-for-all.  It is self-govern-
ment.”81  Likewise, the distinguished mid-century sociologist and celebrated
author of The Lonely Crowd, David Riesman, once wrote that not all free
speech is good speech, as when it may “serve the purpose of self-expression of
a sadistic or masochistic sort.  This may be subjectively pleasurable, but it is
not a form of happiness which is tolerable in a decent community.”82  Yet it is
very rare for contemporary academic writers to speak of the value of free
speech in these collective, politically communitarian terms.  Few would say
now that the First Amendment’s “point of ultimate interest is not the words
of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”83  Free speech is understood
in far more individualistic terms, as the capacity of the American individual
to attack conventions and traditions because such attacks are inherently posi-
tive as an instrument of identity formation.  Free speech’s primary function is
to facilitate “self-realization.”84  The aspiration for “self-governance” articu-
lated by Meiklejohn is transformed from a principle of the political commu-
nity to a principle of individual morality: “For citizens to be free in the sense
championed by the historic mainstream of liberal theory and by civic liber-
alism, they must be self-governing.  They are exempted from the control of
others because they can and do control themselves.”85
There is a parallel trajectory of autonomization for the religion clauses.
That trajectory reflects the Court’s view that the core purpose of the First
Amendment—the protection and promotion of religious liberty as an intrin-
sic good of American political and moral life—is best attained through the
broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause prevalent from 1963 to 1990
(and the statutory regime of religious exemptions enacted thereafter) and
the broad reading of the Establishment Clause inaugurated in 1947.  In the
free exercise context, the key issue concerns exemptions from general laws
on account of religious scruple or objection.  Up until the mid-twentieth cen-
80 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22
(1948).
81 Id. at 23.
82 David Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PUB. POL’Y 33, 78 (1942).
83 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 26 (1960).
84 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982).
85 THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., CIVIC LIBERALISM: REFLECTIONS ON OUR DEMOCRATIC IDE-
ALS 123 (1999).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL408.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-MAY-16 10:00
1482 notre dame law review [vol. 91:4
tury, the Free Exercise Clause protected only against compelled affirmations
and penalties specifically targeting religious beliefs; the dearth of case law
finding that certain exemptions were constitutionally required, coupled with
the Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States, offered almost no support for
constitutionally mandated religious exemptions.86
The Court fundamentally altered the framework for evaluating exemp-
tion claims in 1963, when it introduced a balancing test approach to free
exercise in which a claimant’s asserted “substantial burden” on religious exer-
cise was measured against the quality of the state’s interests in regulation and
the means used to achieve them.87  Whether the issue is drug use, withdrawal
of children from school, conscientious objection to military service (on relig-
ious grounds or otherwise) or to other government-imposed mandates, or
others, in order to satisfy the requirement of substantial burden the claimant
must at a minimum be “sincere” about his religious conviction.  He must be
telling the truth about his beliefs.  Excepting cases of flagrantly and incon-
testably fraudulent claims, however, courts and administrators have shown
great reluctance to inquire into the authenticity of a claimant’s sincerity.88
The claimant’s say-so both about what he believes and how important his
beliefs may be89 are generally sufficient, for the state is not in any position to
question the authenticity of what he says he believes.
More than this, however, an inquiry into the sincerity of a claim goes to
highly personal interests in self-definition.  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, for
example, tells the story of a prison administrator charged with determining
whether a prisoner who desired a Seder dinner was authentically Jewish.90
Though the administrator was not persuaded of the prisoner’s sincerity, he
allowed the dinner because religiosity implicates matters of shifting and
86 98 U.S. 145, 161–67 (1879).  There is a rich debate among scholars about the extent
to which exemptions from generally applicable laws were thought to be constitutionally
mandated in the early Republic. Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990), with Philip A.
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992), and Vincent Phillip Mun˜oz, The Original Meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083 (2008).
No court case ever decided that question before the mid-twentieth century, however.
87 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963).
88 Even here the cases are complicated. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp.
1494, 1508–09 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding that the “Church of Marijuana” was not a bona
fide religion, but refraining from stating that the individual claimant was lying).  This pat-
tern of reticence can be traced to United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944), in
which the Court held that juries ought to determine neither questions of falsity nor sincer-
ity as to religious beliefs because those two are bound up together.
89 Inquiries into the centrality of a particular belief in the individual’s understanding of
what his religion requires have been likewise avoided by courts and are prohibited by the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A) (2012)
(defining religious exercise as “includ[ing] any exercise of religion, whether or not com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief” (emphasis added)).
90 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 453 (1998).
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murky personal identity.91  Furthermore, courts have repeatedly held that an
individual’s beliefs need not correspond at all with—indeed, may run directly
contrary to—the beliefs of the religious group or community with which the
individual claims to be associated.92  Here again, the standard by which relig-
iousness is measured is the individual believer alone.  Notwithstanding what
appears to be a generous test, religious claimants often have lost under it in
court, but the reasons far more frequently involve the solicitude of courts for
government interests that clash with a “substantial burden” than skepticism
about the claimant’s assertion of a burden itself.93
Concerns that the free exercise balancing test authorized a kind of
hyper-pluralized, autonomized anarchy motivated the Court to change
course in Employment Division v. Smith, where it ostensibly returned to the pre-
Sherbert exemption regime.94  But the passage of the federal Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 and the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act in 2000, together with sundry state versions of RFRA,
restored the autonomized approach as the primary test against which relig-
ious exemption claims are evaluated.  These laws generally instruct courts to
avoid inquiries into the centrality of a belief within a religious tradition and
the sincerity of the claimant.95  Even assessments about the substantiality of
the burden on religious belief are a delicate matter, as the subjective percep-
tion of burden cannot be questioned without some danger that a court is
intruding on matters outside its jurisdiction.  Religious exercise is primarily
understood as a matter of autonomous, individual choice—a choice that
must be honored because it is personally “fulfilling”96 and that marks off
one’s distinctive human “identity.”97
True, not all recent doctrinal developments at least arguably concerned
with religious free exercise reflect the contemporary trend toward
autonomization.  But these are largely outliers and have been met with fierce
resistance.  The Court’s recognition of the ministerial exception, for exam-
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.  Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”); Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999)
(emphasizing autonomy interests in religious self-identification notwithstanding a religious
community’s judgment to the contrary).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); see also 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 214 (2006) (“[T]he compelling interest test in exemp-
tion cases has never been quite what it seems.”).
94 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
95 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb1–4 (2012); Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc1–5(7)(A) (2012).
96 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
97 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1853 (2014) (Kagan, J., dis-
senting) (“A person’s response to the doctrine, language, and imagery contained in those
invocations reveals a core aspect of identity—who that person is and how she faces the
world.”).
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ple, seemed to rest in part on the constitutional free exercise rights of relig-
ious organizations, not of individuals.98  Likewise, the Court’s recent decision
in Hobby Lobby held that RFRA protected the free exercise rights of corpora-
tions as well as individuals.99  Yet it is noteworthy that these opinions are
opposed in significant part precisely for their non-autonomized conception
of religious exercise.  The principal Hobby Lobby dissent objected that, unlike
for-profit entities, nonprofit organizations enjoy free exercise rights because
furthering their religious “autonomy . . . often furthers individual religious
freedom as well.”100  And several academics have criticized the Court’s view
of the ministerial exception on the grounds that the autonomy of individuals,
not groups, is the primary if not exclusive object of free exercise protection,
while the religious exercise of groups or organizations is at best parasitic.101
The ministerial exception, moreover, is highly limited in coverage and not
representative of the more general free exercise trends underway.102
The autonomization of the Establishment Clause began in 1947, though
at that time it was blended with the distinct idea of church-state separation-
ism.  The Court’s decision in Everson v. Board of Education is well known for
constitutionalizing Thomas Jefferson’s mural metaphor, which gave the test
the appearance of focusing on the relationship between the separate spheres
of government and religious authority.103  Yet it is noteworthy that Everson
itself dealt not with these abstract divisions, but with the rights of individual
New Jersey taxpayers to refuse to pay money for the transportation of stu-
dents to parochial schools.104  With time, tests evincing the autonomization
of the Clause began to displace the separationist approach in several
contexts.
First, the Court developed an exception to its general prohibition on
individual taxpayer standing: the special nature of the harm inflicted on the
individual taxpayer—the harm to the individual taxpayer’s conscience—
when Congress uses its spending power in putative violation of the Establish-
98 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
702–07 (2012).  The Court relied on both free exercise and anti-establishment rationales
for the ministerial exception.
99 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014).
100 Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
101 See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
190 (2005); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1988–89 (2007) (arguing
that the ministerial exception amounts to “privileging the derivative right over the primary
one”).
102 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2016).
103 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
104 As Justice Jackson noted in his dissenting opinion: “If we are to decide this case on
the facts before us, our question is simply this: Is it constitutional to tax this complainant to
pay the cost of carrying pupils to Church schools of one specified denomination?” Id. at 21
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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ment Clause was held by the Court to require a unique exception to the
usual standing rules.105  Second, as discussed earlier, autonomized tests have
been adopted in the government funding and religious symbolism contexts,
replacing (or subsuming within them) the older separationist approach.  In
the former, the government’s neutrality with respect to programs that pro-
vide funds indirectly to religious institutions is intimately connected with the
existence of “genuine private choice” in the spending of those moneys.
Here, autonomization cures what might otherwise be a constitutional viola-
tion: one individual’s genuine private choice about how to spend his own
money cannot trump another’s.  In the latter, the perceptions of the reasona-
ble observer control the constitutionality of a religious display, and in some
courts’ more recent formulations, government conduct that is motivated by
even the possibility that somebody might perceive religious endorsement
(even if nobody actually has) is itself justified and validated by the Establish-
ment Clause.106  The autonomized Establishment Clause also connects
closely to what Justice Kagan has described as the “breathtakingly generous”
“norm of religious equality”107 at its core: the Constitution requires the gov-
ernment to treat any individual’s genuine private choices, and any individ-
ual’s genuine perceptions of religious exclusion, with great solicitude; to do
otherwise would not show each individual the equality of regard to which he
is entitled.
Yet the fundamental point is that the increasing autonomization of the
First Amendment is believed to be the surest way to maximize freedom for as
broad a range of persons as possible.  Autonomization is one of the primary
mechanisms through which the Court as well as many academic writers have
fulfilled the First Amendment’s core purpose—to protect and promote
speech and religious freedom as intrinsic goods of American society.
II. THE REVISED ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The conventional account of the First Amendment certainly has much
to commend it.  Some genuine and welcome expansions of freedom for
speech and religious exercise have occurred under its auspices.  Neverthe-
less, there are reasons to doubt that its three theses cogently explain the real
position of freedom of speech and religion in American legal and political
life.  This Part offers a revised account of the First Amendment with its own
three theses—not point-by-point refutations so much as basic disagreements
with its premises and its consequences.  It draws in part on the thought of the
late political theorist and constitutional scholar, Walter Berns.  For much of
105 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104–05 (1968). Flast has been narrowed in subsequent
cases, but it remains good law. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S.
125, 130 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 609–10 (2007).
106 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2014); see
also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  For criticism, see generally Marc O. DeGirolami,
The Bloating of the Constitution: Equality and the U.S. Establishment Clause, in THE SOCIAL
EQUALITY OF RELIGION OR BELIEF (Alan Carling ed., 2016).
107 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1841 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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the twentieth century, Berns wrote probingly about many matters of crucial
concern to American political life: patriotism, academic freedom, the history
of political thought, democracy, constitutional history, capital punishment,
and pluralism, among others.  But Berns’s interest in the First Amendment
was a hardy perennial across his writing life, from his first book, Freedom,
Virtue and the First Amendment in 1957, to his final work in 2006, a collection of
essays titled, Democracy and the Constitution.108  His overarching criticism,
developed across decades, was that in developing First Amendment doctrine,
the modern Court (and its academic defenders) utterly ignored—and may
have willfully blinded itself to—the enduring relationship of freedom and
civic virtue.109  That insight informs the revised account offered here.110
A. Freedom Under the First Amendment Is Not an Intrinsic Good of American
Political Life but Part of a Larger Political Problem.
In reflecting on the social and political quality of freedom of speech and
religion, one might begin with the basic observation that no behavior is
purely self-regarding.  Thoughts and beliefs may be matters of entirely inter-
nal concern, but once thoughts and beliefs are expressed in words or con-
duct, they have been externalized.  They are now part of the social realm.
Speech and religious exercise universally affect other people—the hearers or
observers, of course, but also, and albeit less immediately, the society more
broadly.  Almost all expression and conduct that anybody wants to restrict or
even prohibit may be understood as harming third parties, whether those are
the nearest people subjected to it or the more distant social polity.  Moreo-
ver, speech’s and religious exercise’s harmful potentialities are not mitigated
by the fact that no one is compelled to respond, let alone to agree.  The
harm is consummated by the speaker’s act of outward expression and the
hearer’s internalization of that expression.  Oftentimes the harm inflicted by
speech and religious exercise is much graver and more lasting than many
sorts of criminal acts.
108 WALTER BERNS, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (2006) [hereinafter BERNS, DC];
WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957) [hereinafter BERNS,
FVFA].  Other work by Berns considered in this Article includes WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976) [hereinafter BERNS,
FAFAD], together with several uncollected essays and articles.
109 Later in his career, Berns turned somewhat away from his earlier scholarship on
virtue and freedom and toward first-wave originalist arguments emphasizing judicial
restraint. See, e.g., Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 49, 82–83.  This Article hopes to suggest, however, that his earlier work was the
more prescient and penetrating.
110 This Article does not explore (or defend) Berns’s own understanding of freedom’s
relationship to civic virtue, save to note that it is connected to an ancient tradition stretch-
ing back as far as the Aristotelian idea of a citizen as “[h]e who has the power to take part
in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state . . . and . . . a state is a body of
citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, at 127 (Benjamin
Jowett trans., Random House ed. 1943).
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The hurtful potential of speech and religious exercise gives rise to the
problem of freedom under the First Amendment.  The problem is how to
regulate speech and religious exercise so as to limit their potential for exces-
sive social hurt.  By establishing regulatory limits on these freedoms, the soci-
ety protects itself, but it also exercises an instructional function: it teaches its
members about the conditions of civic inclusion and thereby aspires to make
them civically virtuous, to make them worthy of the freedoms it accords.  A
society that limits expression must be alert to the danger that one limit can
easily lead to another.  It should therefore allow as much vicious expres-
sion—whether speech or religious exercise—as may be tolerated.  Yet the
limits on the freedom of speech and religious exercise that any society adopts
(limits that all civil societies have, the rhetoric that they may indulge in not-
withstanding) are precisely a reflection of those words and religious acts that
it deems sufficiently vicious—or sufficiently hurtful—to require regulation.
Thus, rather than an intrinsic good, freedom is instead part of a larger prob-
lem concerning the allocation of a resource that demands political and legal
judgment.  All such judgment curtails some freedoms as it expands others.
Berns’s first reflections on the problem of freedom appear at the begin-
ning of his earliest book, where he considers the issue of censorship.  The
issue, an ancient one in the history of political thought, pits two hoary stock
characters: the civil libertarian and the suppressor of vice.  The civil liberta-
rian contends that any differential treatment of expression, let alone outright
censorship, is disgraceful on the part of any enlightened society that aspires
either to truth or to progress.111  Our age is unique not because there is
more vice than in the past but because there are more, and more efficacious,
methods of reporting and transmitting it.  Is it not better—more enlight-
ened—steadily to increase the freedom of expression of every person?  And is
it not a greater sign of civic vice to prop up officious intermeddlers in other
people’s business, purported guardians of the moral commonweal?  Once
empowered to any degree, the censor “will not be content to stop with the
proscription of the cheap and vulgar, but will continue his depredations
against anything that happens to displease him.”112
The suppressor of vice responds that because public expression inevita-
bly affects and helps to form a society’s tastes, values, and character, govern-
ment has a role to play in defending certain standards of public decency and
morality.  The degraded quality of public expression affects the entire soci-
ety.  But it may be particularly problematic for less privileged sectors of it,
because these are hit hardest by the government’s aloof posturing and lack
other compensating resources.  Yet no quantity of well-intended social work
or money can deal effectively with the problem, which is genuinely universal
in scope.  True, our technological achievements have exacerbated the prob-
lem by increasing the speed and scope of reporting and transmission of all
manner of vicious expression.  But if we are to protect the core institutions
111 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 12.
112 Id. at 14.
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and values of American society and to avoid a kind of “rotting away” from the
inside, American government must assume at least some supervisory role
over the quality of public expression.113
What was unusual in the circumstances of twentieth-century First
Amendment law, in Berns’s view, was not that the civil libertarian was having
the better of the suppressor of vice.  It was instead that the “classic . . . politi-
cal problem” posed by the clash between these archetypes—“each insisting
that its policy represents the true public interest”114—was felt to have been
unequivocally and conclusively decided in favor of the civil libertarian.  More
than this, so thorough was the suppressor of vice’s rout that it appeared to
Berns that the problem of freedom had been forgotten altogether by the
vanquishers.  It was as if there was no longer any problem at all.  More free-
dom just was self-evidently a good thing for everybody.  Yet Berns believed
that freedom was not synonymous with justice, understood even in the thin-
nest sense of a best all-things-considered political arrangement; indeed,
“[f]reedom in itself has no intrinsic merit.”115  “Even for Mill,” Berns
observes, “the goal was not freedom but the improvement of mankind.”116
The First Amendment does not stand in isolation but is only one part of a
Constitution that is a “charter of government” whose objective, as its pream-
ble says, is to “establish[ ] justice.”117  The virtue of justice, not freedom, is
the central principle of American law and politics but “[w]hat was once the
principal purpose of government is now forgotten entirely; the problem of
making men virtuous and deserving of freedom is completely ignored.”118
Much of Berns’s first and most important book was concerned to show
that many of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions in the pre- and
immediate post-War period on the one hand ignored or even explicitly
denied the problem of freedom, while on the other hand tacitly acknowl-
edged it in the cases’ disposition.  Berns first notes that for all the absolutist
rhetoric and cheerleading attending Justice Holmes’s celebrated “clear and
present danger” test, announced in Schenck v. United States and defended in
his Abrams dissent, Schenck was sent to prison with it, while Abrams, Gitlow,
Dennis, and many others were sent to prison despite it.119  Yet even though
the clear and present danger test’s results were at best mixed in these early-
mid-twentieth-century contests, its real influence lay elsewhere.  By having
struggled as an initial matter against national security, expressive freedom
113 Id. at 10–12, 14.
114 Id. at 14.
115 Id. at 126.
116 Id. at 25.
117 Id. at 46 (emphasis omitted).
118 Id. at 229.
119 Id. at 50–53; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503–05 (1951) (plurality
opinion) (though the test had been reformulated by this point); Am. Commc’n Ass’n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 406–12 (1950); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Gil-
bert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S 239 (1920); Schae-
fer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
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was “caparisoned with . . . formidable armor.”120  It was prepared for battles
in which its opponent would be far less imposing an interest than national
security.  It was thereby assigned by the Court to a “preferred position”121—
as enjoying a presumptively victorious posture over all rival civic and social
interests other than national security.
And it did enjoy such victories in several subsequent, important mid-
century decisions concerning the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses and others—
useful cases inasmuch as they blend rights of speech and religious exercise.
In nearly all of these, the claim of religious and expressive freedom won,122
but in Berns’s view, the importance of these cases is the Court’s shifting and
expanding characterization of the core of First Amendment protection.  The
First Amendment right to solicit funds, to accost passersby, to blast speech
from sound trucks in public parks, to approach private homes and to chal-
lenge, and even insult and degrade, the religious beliefs of whomever the
speaker comes into public contact with—all of these were not merely toler-
ated under the “preferred position” approach.  They were instead declared
to occupy the selfsame “preferred position” under the First Amendment as
the right of people to engage in private worship or listen to their chosen
religious teacher: “This form of religious activity occupies the same high
estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preach-
ing from the pulpits.”123  Though the “preferred position” approach to the
First Amendment did not result in absolute victory for expressive freedom in
every case, it steadily shifted cultural understanding about what stood at the
core of First Amendment protection, and which sort of competing interests
in liberty were now disfavored.  That understanding was advanced rhetori-
cally even in cases where the First Amendment expressive interest lost, as
when Justice Douglas argued in his Poulos v. New Hampshire dissent that “even
a reasonable regulation of the right to free speech is not compatible with the
First Amendment.”124
These early decisions already evince the sort of resource reallocation of
freedom that the Court would greatly accelerate in later years.  The freedom
of private householders not to be confronted with insulting or degrading
views of their own religion (surely this is one kind of religious freedom);125
their freedom to be let alone; their freedom not to be badgered and
120 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 70.
121 Id. at 74–75.  The phrase is taken from Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946)).
122 Saia, 334 U.S. at 559–60; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 453 (1938).
123 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 131 (Reed, J., dissenting) (citing Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S.
157, 176 (1943)).
124 345 U.S. 395, 425 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125 As Justice Jackson put it, “[h]ow then can the Court today hold it a ‘high constitu-
tional privilege’ to go to homes, including those of devout Catholics on Palm Sunday
morning, and thrust upon them literature calling their church a ‘whore’ and their faith a
‘racket’?” Douglas, 319 U.S. at 180 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment).
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harangued; the freedom of people to enjoy the amenity of a public park in
relative quiet; the freedom, in sum, of the community, as a community, to
enjoy the benefit of “reasonable regulations” of other people’s expression,
religious or otherwise, that interfered with other public liberties and ways of
life—all were explicitly downgraded in these cases.  Expression detrimental
to these interests was not merely now tolerated as the sort of hurtful or
vicious speech and religious exercise that American society ought not, ordi-
narily and for prudence’s sake, to prohibit.  It was given a makeover.  It was
declared virtuous under the First Amendment and awarded pride of place
right alongside what were previously held to be core features of religious
exercise.  It was said to be perfectly equal to the freedom to select one’s own
place of worship as a protected First Amendment right.  Win or lose, “pre-
ferred position” rhetoric would have a profound effect on the course of
expressive freedom in the decisions that followed.
The point is not that the Court made poor decisions in these cases.  It is
instead that the Court’s decisions reallocated freedom under the First
Amendment in a way that offers some insight about the nature of the contest
between Berns’s stock characters—the civil libertarian and the suppressor of
vice.  Berns presents them as offering competing views of freedom, but in
reality they offer competing views of civic virtue.  Each is indeed “civic-
minded” but it will not do to say that one believes that “freedom of expres-
sion is the hallmark of American civilization”126 while the other believes the
opposite.  Both instead offer distinctive outlooks about the manner in which
First Amendment freedom should be apportioned.  In doing so, both agree
with one another, and disagree with the conventional account, that freedom
is not an intrinsic good of American political life, not the “hallmark of Ameri-
can civilization.”  It is a resource whose reapportionment moves the society
away from one set of political commitments and toward another.  The char-
acters’ different views about the proper allocation of First Amendment
expressive liberty are exactly divergent responses to the problem of freedom.
B. The American State’s Responses to the Problem of Freedom Under the First
Amendment Are Not Neutral as to the Virtuous Political Life.
The second revised thesis follows naturally from the first: the American
state’s, and in particular the Supreme Court’s, responses to the problem of
freedom discussed in the first thesis are not and never have been neutral as
to the virtuous political life.  They have instead reflected distinctive views and
attitudes about virtuous and vicious expression and religious exercise, and
they have served not only to protect the American state from civic vice but
also to instruct it as to civic virtue.
Perhaps the most obvious evidence of the state’s non-neutrality in the
fashioning of First Amendment freedom are the limits that it has always
imposed with respect to content-based expression and religious exercise.
“Whether,” as Berns said, “bad speech is denominated ‘fighting words,’
126 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 14.
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obscenity, or incitations to breaches of the peace, it constitutes an authorita-
tive definition of what is not to be permitted.”127  Those limits have not dis-
appeared since Berns wrote, though several have been modified, others have
been added, and still others weakened.  The point applies with equal force to
those “time, place, and manner” restrictions that receive more forgiving con-
stitutional scrutiny than the ordinary case of the content-based regulation:
Why should “keeping the sidewalks free from obstructions” or the channels
of traffic moving efficiently be self-evidently more important interests in pub-
lic order than upholding other “conventions of decency”?128  Some non-neu-
tral theory of political governance lurks beneath the Court’s doctrinal
categories.  And the same has been true whenever the Court has held that
certain religious exercises are simply not the sort that should enjoy First
Amendment protection, as in the case at one time of polygamy129 or in cases
involving children whose welfare or physical safety may come into conflict
with the religious exercise of their parents.130  These exclusions may have
been crafted on the basis of crude ideas of virtue and vice, but the Justices
who made them and continue to abide by them must have had, and must still
have, in mind at least some such conceptions.
Yet beyond the bare fact that there is some significant subset of speech
and religious exercise that is simply deemed beyond the pale of constitu-
tional protection, there is an additional conceptual puzzle.  As Berns put it,
“different speeches have different consequences and different speakers aim
at different ends,” so that the only polity that actually could foster speech
without any discrimination whatsoever is Babel.131  Which, then, are the ends
aimed at by the Supreme Court’s approach toward First Amendment free
speech?  Berns believed that they were those of a polity “without a public
good” and if this were true, it might tell in favor of the thesis that the Ameri-
can state remains neutral as to any particular view of the virtuous life.  But
there are reasons to doubt that he was right about this.
Consider the second arch-justification for free speech of the conven-
tional account: its truth-seeking function.  The very idea that hard-won truths
are accorded no respect at all, no deference whatsoever, but are thrown right
back into ceaseless competition with new ideas in the “market,” itself reflects
a distinctive view of political and moral virtue.  It is not a neutral perspective
on truth.  It either means that whatever ideas are accepted by the market are
simply labeled “truth” or that truth has some sort of intrinsic advantage over
falsehood that allows it to prevail under free market conditions.  If the latter,
then, as Berns observed, “persecution is illogical because it is unneces-
sary.”132  And if the former, the assumption must be that the only truths are
relative and ephemeral, since these are the only sort that can capture market
127 Id. at 126.
128 BERNS, FAFAD, supra note 108, at 193.
129 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334 (1890).
130 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
131 BERNS, FAFAD, supra note 108, at 194.
132 Id. at 154.
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preferences as consumer desires change.  As a general civic approach to the
question of truth, this is hardly the same as “keeping an open mind” to new
ideas.  It is active disrespect of all existing truths.  The idea of truth in such a
society recedes into the background.  Or perhaps it is more accurate to say
that the only truth—and it is one held to with supreme tenacity—is the
impermanence of any truth obtained and the relentless imperative of change
at the prompting of individual choice and consumer taste.  As Gerhart
Niemeyer once observed:
It seems good and desirable to keep talking, while the result of the talk
becomes something of secondary importance, a by-product which is destined
to be discarded as soon as it has been obtained.  In this way, the quest for
truth is turned into an exciting game rather than a serious and exacting
endeavor, a game in which, like the Caucus Race in “Alice,” all are winners
and receive the prize of official recognition.133
“Recognition” is indeed an apt general description of the virtues toward
which the Supreme Court reoriented the First Amendment during the twen-
tieth century.  Berns traces the development of free speech doctrine in pre-
cisely this direction in discussing two mid-century decisions, Beauharnais v.
Illinois134 and Terminiello v. Chicago.135  In Beauharnais, the president of the
White Circle League of America was convicted of distributing pamphlets call-
ing on the City of Chicago to devote resources to stopping the “rapes, robber-
ies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro” and to prevent the
“mongreliz[ation]” of the white race.136  The Illinois statute, Berns argued,
needed to be understood and evaluated in light of the factual conditions in
Chicago, which had experienced the evil of massive racial strife in the years
preceding the statute’s enactment.137  Beauharnais, moreover, was not pun-
ished for any criticism of the government or its public officials; he was not
punished, as the conventional account’s first justification has it, for calling
the government to account for its misconduct; rather, he was punished for
advocating illegal action against fellow citizens and for disturbing the peace
of those citizens (that is to say, their liberty).  There may be prudential rea-
sons to tolerate Beauharnais’s speech but the question at least merited a thor-
ough discussion of the competing private and civic interests at stake.  Yet to
hear the dissenting Justices, one would think that the decision to uphold the
conviction was the act of an unabashedly tyrannical government.138  The
commitment to freedom takes no cognizance of social facts; any restriction
on individual expression, no matter the context, is anathema for “all legisla-
133 Gerhart Niemeyer, A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Free Speech, 25 THOUGHT: FORDHAM
U. Q. 251, 255 (1950).
134 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
135 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
136 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.
137 See BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 61–64, 148–55 (discussing Beauharnais).
138 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting) (“State experimentation in curb-
ing freedom of expression is startling and frightening doctrine in a country dedicated to
self-government by its people.”).
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tion of this type [is] the act[ ] of tyrants.”139  The only political problem in
view—the only one thought to be important in evaluating these disputes—is
the state’s authority as against the individual’s, and the state’s denial to the
individual of his “say in matters of public concern.”140  To deny a person his
“say” is nothing less than an act of tyranny.
Terminiello represents one bright bloom in the flowering of this
approach to speech protection under the First Amendment.  In a 5-4 deci-
sion authored by Justice Douglas, the Court overturned the conviction for
breaching the peace of a Catholic priest whose expression was intended to
whip up a crowd inside an auditorium into a frenzy against a second crowd
pressing to enter the auditorium and hurling bricks, rocks, bottles, and
icepicks.141  The speech was clearly intended to incite the disturbance of a
mob and was laced with fascist epithets of hate and vilification aimed at par-
ticular classes and races of people.  In characterizing the nature of the free
speech interest at stake in Terminiello, Justice Douglas offered this:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on
free discussion. . . .  [I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of
ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and
peaceful change is effected.  The right to speak freely and to promote diver-
sity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets
us apart from totalitarian regimes.
Accordingly, a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. . . .  Speech is often provocative and challenging.  It may
strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects
as it presses for acceptance of an idea.142
The passage is remarkable.  First, Douglas says that Chicago was wrong to
punish Terminiello not merely because “his speech did not produce a dan-
ger of substantive evil”143 but because it was positively civically healthful—it
was precisely the sort of speech that lies at the heart of the First Amendment.
Second, the path from the neutrality of toleration to the non-neutrality of
promotion was thereby illuminated: the ideal society actually ought to pro-
mote and celebrate speech like Terminiello’s because of the crucial civic
function it performs.  This is full-bloodedly virtuous speech, not the sort of
ineffectually vicious speech (or what Justice Frankfurter at one time called
“[w]holly neutral futilities”)144 that should not be regulated.  Third, there
may even be a possibility that Terminiello’s advocacy of race and class hatred
and massive bloodletting in the streets actually will persuade market actors of
its truth and of the falsity of their contrary “prejudices and preconceptions.”
Since such a possibility exists, the state is powerless to restrict Terminiello’s
139 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 154.
140 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 270.
141 See the description in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
142 Id. at 4–5 (majority opinion).
143 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 156.
144 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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speech.  The implication is that it is better to be governed by fascist ideas
than to regulate the market consumer’s taste for them.  Finally, if “inviting
dispute” even in this manner is the central function of free speech protec-
tion, then it seems to have far more to do with Terminiello’s own authority to
do so in the manner he chooses as measured against the state’s authority to
regulate it—and the extent to which, as Niemeyer put it, the state must “rec-
ognize” his authority—than with “free debate and free exchange of ideas”
among the rabble to whom, and against whom, Terminiello’s self-expression
was aimed.
The course of free speech protection has run fairly smooth ever since.
Many of the types of arguments in Terminiello concerning public debate and
the capacity of speech to influence the public have been advanced as the
core reasons to protect speech in several more contemporary cases that seem
to have absolutely nothing to do with public debate.  Speech, as Chief Justice
Roberts has said, “can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.”145  Yet to speak of
Cohen’s speech, or Westboro Baptist Church’s speech, or Stevens’s speech,
or EMA’s speech, as speech that attempts to “persuade” others of some con-
troversial position on a matter of public concern, as the Court often does,
seems quite irrelevant.146  If “persuasion” is defined, as David Strauss has
argued, as “a process of appealing, in some sense, to reason”147—then it
verges on the farcical to suggest that animal crush videos, visual depictions of
the titillating slaughter of Black people and Jews, and lies about easily verifia-
ble facts such as the earning of military honors perform this function.  But
First Amendment protection of speech of this kind does perform the func-
tion simultaneously of revindicating claims of individual recognition by state
authority and stimulating ever more appalling expressive aggressions.148
By placing such speech squarely within the realm of First Amendment
protection, the law exercises an instructional function that is anything but
neutral.  It teaches that there is no difference between disinterested ideas
and self-interested ideas, and that the former are not publicly acknowledged
to deserve any preference whatsoever over the latter.  The suggestion is that
civic virtue as well as truth (the first two justifications of the conventional
account) will emerge more readily from the clash of self-interested “market”
concerns—concerns, that is, implicating the self’s “recognition”—than from
a rational public debate among “scholars and saints.”149  All are equally virtu-
145 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011).
146 See BERNS, DC, supra note 108, at 128 (“[A]nger provokes anger, as it did in this
instance, not agreement or accommodation.”).
147 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334, 335 (1991).
148 In reflecting on Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), Berns notes that “deprived
now of flag-burning—because it is no longer illegal—Johnson and his friends would have
to find new and, of necessity, more egregious ways to aggress against the symbols, the
conventions, or the mores which, as Tocqueville argued, provide the foundation of
America’s laws and its political life.” BERNS, DC, supra note 108, at 130.
149 Niemeyer, supra note 133, at 255–57.
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ous and equally meritorious of public acknowledgment.  It teaches that “men
must at least threaten the use of private force in order to vindicate their
private rights,”150 which is not an implausible way to understand the upshot
of the Stolen Valor Act case, in which the Court suggested that lies about
factual matters are protected speech unless they are conjoined to some spe-
cific private legal claim such as fraud or defamation.151  And it teaches that
the only real threat to the virtuous society is the dictator, and that justice is
“merely the absence of governmental tyranny.”152  As Justice Breyer noted in
his EMA dissent: “This case is ultimately less about censorship than it is about
education.  Our Constitution cannot succeed in securing the liberties it seeks
to protect unless we can raise future generations committed cooperatively to
making our system of government work.”153  Citizenship, Breyer seems to
mean, implies “public-spiritedness, which is akin to patriotism, and has to be
cultivated.”154  But the hour was late for Breyer’s appeal; nearly sixty years
earlier, the Court pronounced that “[w]hat is one man’s amusement, teaches
another’s doctrine.”155
One may be somewhat briefer as to state neutrality under the religion
clauses.  Consider only one prominent issue implicating establishmentarian
concerns: the relationship of religion and the education of American citi-
zens.  From the very beginning, the state never was neutral as to the sort of
religion that was consistent with civic education and the sort that was a threat
to it.  The history of American public education may be told as a history of
gradual secularization driven not by religious neutrality but religious enthusi-
asm.  In the American colonies and well into the nineteenth century, the
churches took primary charge of education.  Even where public schools were
established, their curriculum was distinctively Christian.  Early nineteenth-
century Massachusetts schools were at first colored by a kind of pietistic Cal-
vinism, after which there was an effort to diminish their distinctive Congrega-
tionalism.  Horace Mann, that emblem of the early development of the
government school, himself supported “religious instruction in our schools
to the extremest verge to which it can be carried without invading those
rights of conscience which are established by the laws of God and guaranteed
to us by the Constitution of the State [of Massachusetts].”156
Church education was thus fitfully replaced by varieties of government-
sponsored and administered Christian education.  As time passed, the quality
of the religious instruction became progressively diluted—less religiously spe-
cific, certainly, but not less specifically religious.  Justice Frankfurter once
praised the public school as “a symbol of our secular unity”157 but he might
150 BERNS, FAFAD, supra note 108, at 201.
151 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
152 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 163.
153 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2771 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154 BERNS, DC, supra note 108, at 142.
155 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
156 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 332 (rev. ed. 1967).
157 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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have more precisely described it as a symbol of our religious division.  The
increasing secularity of public education grew from disagreement about the
properly religious character of the government school—about the sort of
religion needed to sustain the republic.  In the contemporary period, as the
liberal Protestantism of the public school has been drained of any vestigial
Protestantism,158 there remains only the liberalism as the embodiment of the
nation’s civic ideals.  Like all government organs, public schools are now
bound by the Supreme Court’s constitutional injunction not to “endorse”
religion in ways that make non-adherents feel like political outsiders.  The
secular projects and aspirations of the liberal state sustain the American
polity.
There is a parallel history concerning the American state’s posture
toward religious schools, the chief case of which is the Catholic parochial
school.  Catholics were driven by the government-endorsed Protestantism of
the nineteenth century to adopt a separate system of privately funded school-
ing that by the mid-twentieth century educated millions of students.  Those
that opposed this divergence believed—not without reason—that a uniform,
government-endorsed Protestantism was an important force of American
civic acculturation for the young.
They conceived a name for the separate Catholic system—“sectarian”
education—and found champions in Ulysses S. Grant and James G. Blaine,
Senator from Maine, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and a Repub-
lican candidate for President in the election of 1884, who pressed for a fed-
eral constitutional amendment explicitly forbidding any financial aid to
“sectarian” institutions.  This was done precisely in the name of the radical
“separation of church and state”—not because amendment advocates like
Grant and Blaine believed that the Constitution required separationism, but
because they thought it did not.159  Though the federal amendment failed,
proscriptions against the funding of “sectarian” schools found their way into
many state constitutions in later years in so-called “Blaine amendments.”
The failure of the federal constitutional amendment contributed to a
new focus on constitutional interpretation and invented genealogies con-
cerning the Establishment Clause’s true or essential separationist principle.
In time, this approach met with far greater success.  Beginning in the late
1940s and until fairly recently, church-state separationism represented the
Supreme Court’s favored approach to Establishment Clause issues involving
government funding of religious institutions.160  Most recently, as discussed
above, the Court has instead preferred a seemingly more egalitarian regime
of “neutrality”—sameness of treatment for religion and non-religion.
Yet a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court provides only one fairly
recent example of how decidedly partial an ostensibly neutral legal regime
158 See generally JOSEPH BOTTUM, AN ANXIOUS AGE: THE POST-PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF AMERICA (2014).
159 This history is recounted at length in PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE 287–359 (2004).
160 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
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actually can be.161  Colorado’s Douglas County School District had instituted
a program through which certain students accepted by private schools—
religious and nonreligious—were eligible to receive a tuition scholarship.162
The money went to the students’ families, who would then pay it to the
school they had chosen to attend.163  Roughly ninety-three percent of partici-
pating students chose to attend a religious school.164  The key issue in the
case was this program’s constitutionality under Colorado’s 1876 Blaine
Amendment, enacted at the zenith of the controversy concerning the civic
and religious character of public education and the government’s hostility
toward Catholic education.165  The law prohibits the state from making “any
appropriation, or pay[ing] from any public fund or moneys whatever, any-
thing in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectarian pur-
pose.”166  Refusing to consider the extensive historical context of the word
“sectarian,” the court arrived at the conclusion that “sectarian” is synonymous
with “religious.”167  The Amendment therefore prohibits the use of any state
moneys that might even indirectly “support” or “sustain” religious schools by
facilitating students’ attendance, seemingly including payments for infra-
structure and basic safety measures.
And yet, in light of this result, “sectarian” does not sound particularly
neutral; or, to the extent it does, it sounds in the rather counterintuitive
neutrality of state-endorsed religious hostility.  Yet even this perspective on
the question of neutrality passes over the colossal non-neutrality of the gov-
ernment’s systematic and exclusive funding of its own putatively religion-neu-
tral schools, to the detriment of able students—many of them from poor and
educationally underserved communities—who would greatly benefit from
private religious schooling.  Neutrality between religion and non-religion
seems to demand a plainly partial allocation of resources, as the first revised
thesis has already argued.  Or, one variety of government neutrality—no
funding of religious schools—obstructs the achievement of another—educa-
tional opportunity.168
True, American education is only one issue impacted by the First
Amendment’s religion clauses.  Yet at least as to that issue, the place of relig-
ion in American educational life—whether in the nation’s public schools or
in its position on private religious schools—will not be answered by First
Amendment neutrality talk, for the fundamental reason that nothing in the
projects of American education is or ever has been neutral toward religion.
161 Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015).
162 Id. at 464.
163 Id. at 465.
164 Id. at 466.
165 COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (amended 1876).
166 Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d at 470 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (amended
1876) (emphasis omitted)).
167 Id.
168 For further discussion of the multiple, clashing meanings of “neutrality” in the relig-
ion clause context, see DEGIROLAMI, supra note 56, at 15–33, 59–78.
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From the very first, it was precisely the non-neutrality of the state toward
religion that has been one of the prime catalysts of cultural and legal devel-
opment in American education policy, public and private.  There is an
understandable tendency among some opponents of state Blaine amend-
ments such as Colorado’s to reduce them to simple expressions of non-neu-
tral anti-Catholicism.  Often they were that, but they were more.
To understand them merely in these terms—as lamentable examples of
“discrimination”—misunderstands them.  It consigns them to a history from
which we have happily progressed now that we have entered an epoch in
which the making of discriminations is said to be taboo.  But to repudiate the
Blaine amendments is not to rid ourselves of the very real problem they
addressed.  That problem—how to foster through education the common
civic culture upon which the American polity, even still, depends—remains
pressing.  The Blaine amendments were woefully inadequate responses to
that problem, but responses nonetheless.  The empty bromide of religious
neutrality is no response at all.
C. The Autonomization of First Amendment Freedom Reflects a Distinctive View of
the Virtuous Society Coincident with Significant Features of the Court’s
Post–New Deal Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence.
The final thesis of the revised account concedes to the conventional
account at least this much: The Supreme Court has in fact steadily
autonomized the First Amendment.  But it departs from the conventional
account in denying that First Amendment autonomization has had the effect
of increasing everyone’s liberty.  It holds instead that the autonomized First
Amendment has reinforced and itself gained strength from significant fea-
tures of the Court’s post–New Deal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,
particularly the Court’s decisions involving sex as a civil liberty.  The
autonomization of the First Amendment thus has rendered virtuous certain
distinctive political and social commitments and greatly devalued, if not ren-
dered vicious, others.
Two preliminary points are worth bearing in mind.  First, as Berns
observed, the First Amendment does not sit alone, in isolation, as the only
provision of the Constitution.169  It inevitably interacts with, affects, and is
affected by the interpretation of other provisions.  The second is Isaiah Ber-
lin’s well-known distinction between positive and negative freedom.170  If
freedom is understood in its positive sense, as self-realization or self-actualiza-
tion, then concerns about coercion (the negative sense of freedom) may
become obscured.  If an individual is free just exactly to the extent that he
has realized his authentic self, then others may be in a position to know bet-
ter what his authentic self-fulfillment demands.
169 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 46.
170 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121–22
(1971).
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Cohen v. California, we have already seen, stands for the proposition that
an autonomized First Amendment is, as Justice Harlan said, the only
“approach [that] would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests.”171  Justice Thomas has likewise
emphasized that “the right to free speech is a right held by each American,
not by Americans en masse.”172  This repeated emphasis on “individual dig-
nity and choice” is telling.  Yet not all varieties of dignity and choice stand on
equal footing.  For example, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court held that
though a state law restricting the sale or use of pharmacy records was
intended to preserve the “personal privacy and the dignity” of medical prov-
iders, that was an insufficiently important interest to limit pharmaceutical
companies’ access to this information.173  Some dignitarian interests are
more important than others.  It therefore becomes necessary to discern
which sorts of dignitarian interests or interests in personal autonomy and
“recognition” have been promoted and themselves reinforced by the
autonomized First Amendment and which have suffered.  The conventional
account’s third justification for First Amendment freedom may have swal-
lowed up the others but official, government-conferred “recognition” is, per
the first revised thesis, a finite resource.  It, too, requires judgment about
allocation.
Here there are likely many answers, discussion of which would exceed
the scope of this Article.  One in particular, however, seems highly salient.
The question of differential dignitarian recognition is complicated by other
developments in constitutional law in the mid-twentieth century, a crucial
one of which concerns the then-emerging jurisprudence of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  During the period that the Court was
recharacterizing the First Amendment as a “preferred position,” it was also
using the Due Process Clause to incorporate the First Amendment’s several
provisions against the states.174  What Berns called “First Amendment sub-
stantive due process”175 came to mean not that some federal protection for
First Amendment freedom against state interference was “implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause, but that pre-
ferred position liberty for the First Amendment was implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.176  The autonomization of the First Amendment was thus
conceptually conjoined to and occurred concurrently with the rise of the sub-
stantive due process values of equality and sexual autonomy in some of the
Court’s most important post–New Deal jurisprudence.
In a fascinating study of the emergence of “sex as a civil liberty” in the
United States, historian Leigh Ann Wheeler chronicles the pivotal role of the
171 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
172 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 420 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
174 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
175 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 102.
176 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).
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American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in the early-mid-twentieth century in
“gradually adopt[ing] sexual expression, practice, and privacy as civil liber-
ties” and “persuad[ing] courts to do the same.”177  One of Wheeler’s basic
insights is that the key to unlocking the vault of sexual liberties, subsequently
enshrined by the Supreme Court in the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, was the ACLU’s series of “carefully
crafted lawsuits” defending increased scope for sexual expression under the
First Amendment.178  The ACLU began by defending unconventional speech
about sex in court in the 1930s and 1940s, focusing primarily on regulations
involving advocacy of birth control, sex education, nudism, and theater per-
formances.179  Even in these early years, one of the ACLU’s important under-
lying objectives was the “repeal of all birth control laws,” so that attacking
regulations on the distribution of literature about birth control as a First
Amendment violation was a strategic choice—it was both part of the ACLU’s
“First Amendment agenda” and an effective means of achieving other aims
relating to sexual conduct.180
Wheeler details how champions of sexual liberties later deployed the
very same “marketplace of ideas” metaphor that represents the truth-ori-
ented justification of the conventional account of the First Amendment in
order to create consumer rights out of the First Amendment.181  Sexual
expression was the First Amendment consumable, and it was increasingly
regarded as a fundamental feature of individual identity and autonomous
choice in ways having nothing to do with democratic governance:
Political theorists had long linked citizens’ access to information with
democracy, but they did so by prioritizing communitarian values that treated
citizens in the aggregate as a tool for achieving and sustaining democracy.
What the ACLU did, increasingly in partnership with commercial producers
and other interest groups, was . . . designed to empower citizens to claim
access to information and images as an individual right.  As ACLU leaders
and others reframed the First Amendment to include consumers’ rights,
they abandoned, once and for all, their earlier commitment to defending
only matter created for educational, political, artistic, or intellectual pur-
poses and increasingly defended material produced purely for profit and
pleasure.182
Though the ACLU had its setbacks—as when its position that obscenity
stood at the core of the First Amendment alongside political speech was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States183—even in defeat, it
succeeded in convincing the Court to adopt a comparatively narrow defini-
177 LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 3–4 (2013).
178 Id. at 3–5.
179 Id. at 39–59; see, e.g., Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
180 WHEELER, supra note 177, at 50, 52–53.
181 Id. at 61.
182 Id. (footnote omitted).
183 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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tion of obscenity.184  Mid-century “ACLU leaders,” Wheeler explains, “saw
great promise in the potential for recent cultural and judicial developments
to liberate sexual expression.”185  The new First Amendment focus on the
autonomized wants and choices of the consumer of expression brought “to
sexual expression the gloss and respectability of constitutional rights.”186
Wheeler’s work demonstrates how the constitutional protection of
autonomized sexual practices that took flight in the 1960s and resulted in
claims of constitutional rights to “reproductive freedoms” of various kinds
and eventually to sexual equality more broadly can be traced directly to the
greatly enhanced and autonomized protection of sexual expression under the
First Amendment preceding it.  Indeed, the First Amendment’s penumbras
were one putative textual source of the “right to privacy” held by the Court to
forbid regulation of access to contraception for married couples.187  The
right of privacy itself was later in turn recycled by the Court to prohibit on
First Amendment grounds the criminalization of the private possession of
obscene material, for the First Amendment protects “the right to satisfy
[one’s] intellectual and emotional needs” in the home.188  And in still later
decades, the mutually reinforcing connection between conduct and expres-
sion persisted and expanded as “ACLU leaders increasingly supported the
efforts of homosexual rights activists—along with purveyors and consumers
of sexual material—to expand access.”189
One of the book’s more refreshing features is the identification of spe-
cific losers in this generational struggle ostensibly about freedom, but in real-
ity about the nature of the virtuous society.  The losers included organized
religious institutions, especially Protestant and Catholic groups, whose core
tenets reflected a wildly different ethic than that pressed by advocates of the
individualist, autonomous, consumer-oriented model of sexuality.  They also
included those citizens—religious or not—who believed that the political
commonweal, as a joint civic enterprise, was ill served in various ways by the
expansion of sexual liberty and by the consumerization of the First Amend-
ment.190  Their freedom from what they regarded as the folly of the ACLU’s
position, a position that was increasingly embraced by the Court and held to
represent the very foundation of the First Amendment, was at stake.  Wheeler
includes a fragment from a representative letter to the ACLU written by one
of these losers—a woman who objected that “freedom is not always a matter
of being able to choose what we want to do, but rather peace of mind
through knowing we are doing what is right,”191 a sense of right according to
the common conventions of decent social behavior then extant.  Yet a major
184 WHEELER, supra note 177, at 71–72.
185 Id. at 79.
186 Id. at 91.
187 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
188 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
189 WHEELER, supra note 177, at 153.
190 Id. at 77.
191 Id.
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part of what Wheeler celebrates as the achievement of the ACLU was to
downgrade such ideas under law—to demote them as civic ideals of virtue
and even perhaps to render them vicious.  Once the Court had been per-
suaded of the “sanctity of freedom of speech and sexual privacy” as standing
at “the very core of American constitutionalism,”192 resistance to such rights,
even in the name of First Amendment freedom, gradually became an anti-
constitutional point of view.
It is difficult to devise a single, unifying description of the losers in this
massive contest over the nature of American civic virtue.  One plausible can-
didate, however, is what Roger Scruton once called the partisans of the “cor-
porate person.”193  The idea that “human individuals derive their
personality,” including and especially their commitments concerning human
sexuality, “in part from corporations” (particularly churches, families, social
and civic groups, and other similar institutions whose function is to fix and
transmit traditional ways of life) and that as a result “corporate personality
should be consecrated in our feelings, and acknowledged in our law”194 grad-
ually but steadily was devalued in twentieth-century First and Fourteenth
Amendment law.  Those with allegiances to such corporate structures believe
that they are “not a means but an end: a bond in which you are at rest, as you
are at rest beside your hearth.  [They are] object[s] of respect and
esteem.”195  People like Wheeler’s letter-writer, who would derive not only
their understandings of virtue and vice but also their civic “peace of mind”
through the influence of and association with corporate bodies (religious or
otherwise) would suffer under the new doctrine.  And, Wheeler suggests, it
was right and good that they should.
Set against this background, the language of individual dignity and
equality used over and again by the Supreme Court in the discussion of sex as
a civil liberty comes into sharper focus.  “Few decisions,” the Court would
write in Thornburgh—a case that, inter alia, involved the freedom to dissemi-
nate information about abortion to women who were considering it—are
“more basic to individual dignity and autonomy”196 than the freedom to con-
trol one’s own role in procreation.  The freedom to make such “intimate and
personal choices” is “central to personal dignity and autonomy,”197 the “dig-
nity” of “free persons” that inheres “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person.”198  And the state is now, pace Jus-
tice Thomas, an active participant in these matters, bestowing dignity as well
192 Id. at 224.
193 Roger Scruton & John Finnis, Corporate Persons, 63 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y SUP-
PLEMENTARY VOL. 239, 240 (1989).
194 Id. at 240–41.
195 Id. at 245.
196 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1993) (on other
grounds).
197 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
198 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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as equality.199  It must “confer[ ]” the “equal dignity” that attends marital
status on same-sex couples in accordance with what the Court has constitu-
tionalized as the “evolving understanding of the meaning of equality,”200 for
the Court has declared that “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men
or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such
profound choices.”201
Indeed, Wheeler’s account in many ways proves too much for purposes
of the connection suggested here.  The book documents a concerted, delib-
erate, and successful effort by advocates of sexual freedom to use the First
Amendment strategically to achieve their broader aims, aims that the
Supreme Court steadily constitutionalized under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as the twentieth century drew on.  It was only when the tension between
ever-expanding rights of sexual freedom and broader sexual egalitarian ide-
als came to light—as in the late twentieth-century controversies over rape
reform and sexual harassment laws—that the ACLU moderated its sexual lib-
ertarianism so as to parry accusations that it was “privileging men’s over
women’s rights and liberty over equality.”202  Interesting and believable as
evidence of such an explicit, intentional campaign may be, it is not necessary
in order to show that the First Amendment’s autonomization represents not
universal maximization of freedom but a particular, non-neutral response to
the problem of freedom in which certain social values are given political and
legal priority and others demoted.  The goods of sexual libertinism and sex-
ual choice-making as individual consumables with legal status—sex as a civil
right in all of its multifarious dignitarian and egalitarian dimensions, utterly
deracinated from all traditional corporate influence—may not have been the
only social and political values that achieved new constitutional status as a
result of the autonomization of the First Amendment, but they certainly were
primary beneficiaries of the new dispensation.  They became political virtues.
Opposition to them became political vices.203
Elsewhere, I have discussed at length the complex and changing status
of religious freedom in the context of the rise of these far more powerful
legal forces.204  The autonomization of religious free exercise (first constitu-
tionally, then statutorily) and disestablishment represents one answer to the
problem of freedom in which some types of religious freedom have been
successful and others either have suffered or at the very least are subject to
increasingly strong challenges.  Claims of religious freedom that are per-
199 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“The government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.”).
200 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
201 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
202 WHEELER, supra note 177, at 179–80.
203 Berns saw this as well: “With us, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau would have said, vice has
taken on the likeness of decency.  (What he did say is this: ‘Vice hardly insinuates itself by
shocking decency but by taking on its likeness.’).” BERNS, DC, supra note 108, at 135 (quot-
ing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, POLITICS AND THE ARTS: LETTER TO M. D’ALEMBERT ON THE
THEATRE 124 (Allan Bloom trans., 1960)).
204 See generally DeGirolami, supra note 102.
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ceived not to threaten the dignitarian and egalitarian gains achieved through
the powerful union of speech and sex rights remain relatively uncontrover-
sial.  Religion that is essentially powerless, marginal, isolated, and discon-
nected from countervailing interests in autonomy, equality, and sexual
freedom—religion, for example, that gives rise to claims for exemption from
general laws by prisoners and tiny, exotic groups—can win the universal
approbation of the Court.205  This is to the Court’s credit, of course, but it is
also religious liberty whose cost has been comparatively cheap.  Religion, on
the other hand, that is perceived to stand athwart the new regime of individ-
ual dignity, sexual autonomy, and equality elicits violent disagreement on the
Court together with a veritable political and cultural tempest.206  There are
parallel phenomena in the establishment area, though the situation is com-
plicated.  Separation of church and state is championed if it is perceived to
support the autonomized, voluntarist conception of religious liberty and to
strike at the historical and cultural connections between the American state
and organized, corporate Christian traditions.  But church-state separation is
far more controversial when it is perceived to immunize the corporate per-
sonhood of religious groups, especially Christian ones, from government reg-
ulations forbidding discrimination on certain specific bases, including and
especially sex and sexual orientation.
The next Part of this Article explores some of these developments and
their implications for the relationship of virtue and freedom under the First
Amendment.  For now, it is sufficient to observe, with Berns, that the critical
question is not “from whom and under what circumstances, is a ‘right’ to free
speech withdrawn, but rather, to whom is the freedom of speech granted.”207  The
answer to this question inevitably must be that we grant the freedom of
speech, as we do the freedom of religion, “to those we can trust not to misuse
the privilege,”208 always guided by political judgments about the sorts of vir-
tuous uses and vicious misuses to which the freedoms may be put.
III. THE PROBLEM OF VIRTUE AND FREEDOM REMEMBERED
It is at least some evidence in favor of the revised account and against
the conventional account of the First Amendment that the problem of free-
dom seems to have been remembered, at least if one is to judge by the bur-
geoning academic literature arguing for novel and aggressive limitations on
the freedoms of religion and speech.  That literature vindicates the view that
virtue and freedom are inextricably linked and must give rise to the problem
identified and explored in the revised account of the First Amendment.
Indeed, some of the very virtues facilitated and promoted by the conven-
205 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Gonzales v. O Centro Espı´rita
Beneficente Unia˜o do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709
(2005); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
206 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Priests for Life
v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (2014).
207 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 251.
208 Id.
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tional account of the First Amendment are now informing arguments for its
limitation.  This Part samples and explores some of those arguments.  To this
point, the Supreme Court has not accepted these arguments (though some
Justices have come close), but it ought to consider them closely if judged
against the First and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine that it has created.
A. Enumerated Rights Lochnerism
One newly prominent category of critique contends that freedom of
speech and religious freedom for corporate entities—certainly for for-profit
entities but perhaps also nonprofit entities—represents the “Lochnerization”
of the First Amendment.209  In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court held
that an unenumerated constitutional right to economic freedom, nominally
located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rendered
New York’s daily and weekly hour regulations for bakers unconstitutional.210
Yet “Lochner” as an epithet of contempt refers to the more general phenome-
non of what Jedediah Purdy has called “the Supreme Court’s desultory affair
with economic libertarianism”211 that came to a welcome (from the perspec-
tive of most legal academics)212 end in 1937.  Objecting to the “market
ordering” assumptions implicit in claims of corporate religious accommoda-
tion, for example, critics who take this line charge the Court with ignoring
the differential power relationships between employers and employees
obstructing virtuous regulation.
Consider, for example, Elizabeth Sepper’s claims with respect to corpo-
rate religious accommodation.  Sepper argues that the Court in cases like
Hobby Lobby “perceive[s] the market as a legally and economically neutral
baseline” that justifies exempting religiously objecting corporations213 from
regulations that protect vital interests in “health, social insurance, and non-
209 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommo-
dations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of
Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (2015); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperi-
alism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 661; Kenneth D. Katkin, Symposium Introduction, First
Amendment Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation of Non-
Speech Economic Activity, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 365 (2006); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitution-
alism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014); Elizabeth Sepper,
Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015); see also Nina Totenberg, Rare
Unanimity in Supreme Court Term, with Plenty of Fireworks, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 6, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/06/329235293/rare-unanimity-in-supreme-court-term-with-
plenty-of-fireworks (statement of Akhil Amar) (“[Hobby Lobby] is a new Lochner.”).  Another
recent article depending on arguments ostensibly drawn from Lochner includes Oleske,
supra note 9.
210 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
211 Purdy, supra note 209, at 196.
212 But see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING Lochner: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
213 Sepper, supra note 209, at 1519.  Sepper argues that one feature of the corporate
free exercise claims she addresses is that the asserted economic and religious interests are
so entangled as to be virtually indistinguishable. Id. at 1465 (“[B]usinesses define their
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discrimination.”214  As in Lochner, the Court in Hobby Lobby and courts in sim-
ilar cases involving corporate free exercise regard—whether in the
constitutional or statutory context—“any change from the market” as the
compelled “redistribution” of rights, but this baseline is anything but neutral
when it comes to the status of employee interests vis-a`-vis their employers.215
Thus, as “[e]conomic libertarianism becomes the baseline for constitutional
and statutory analysis,”216 the regulatory state is systematically disabled from
redistributing rights and responsibilities in the sort of beneficent way that
would “mitigate harm that the status quo impose[s] on individuals and soci-
ety.”217  Though the general point is claimed to apply more broadly, the
redistribution of rights and responsibilities of most immediate and sustained
interest to Sepper concerns “nondiscrimination” norms and “health,” nearly
the exclusive explicit example of which is the purchase of birth control but
that probably extends at least as far as the broader panoply of rights in repro-
ductive freedom.218
Sepper moreover criticizes the religiously voluntaristic assumption that
employees who choose to work for religious employers—and, indeed, indi-
viduals who choose to associate themselves with religious institutions—do so
with the true capacity to consent to the religious conditions of association
(paradigmatically, employment conditions that are rooted in religious
views).219  Her fundamental complaint is that utilizing the market as a neu-
tral baseline obstructs the state from further regulation to promote sexual
equality.  “Sex equality and public health became irrelevant”220 under
existing law because the state is prohibited from interfering with the natural
operations of the market in order, for example, to redistribute the burden of
purchasing birth control from female employees onto their employers.  Like-
wise, the general social good of increasing “[a]ntidiscrimination protections”
is not adequately realized because such protections “become necessary only
where the market fails—that is, where pervasive discrimination means ‘mar-
kets will not solve the problem’ and individuals will not find alternative prov-
iders.”221  But “[t]his view implies that a competitive market inflicts no harm
that justifies government intervention in the private order.”222  Indeed, “Free
Exercise Lochnerism reduces the goals of antidiscrimination law to remedy-
religious liberty as the ability to contract and view redistribution as a burden on their free
exercise.”).
214 Id. at 1459.
215 Id. at 1461.
216 Id. at 1471.
217 Id. at 1478.
218 See, e.g., id. at 1476 (“The contraceptive mandate litigation, in particular, reveals
vigorous resistance to redistribution.”).
219 Id. at 1474.
220 Id. at 1479.
221 Id. at 1480–81 (quoting Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidis-
crimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125,
133 (2006)).
222 Sepper, supra note 209, at 1481.
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ing exclusion from the market,” thereby ignoring its core purpose—to rectify
harms to personal dignity.223
What is of interest for this Article is not the cogency of these claims,224
but instead that they vindicate several times over the revised account of the
First Amendment.  They constitute a distinctive view of the limits of First
Amendment freedom in the light of specific commitments to promote civic
virtue, and to protect against civic “harm” or vice, commitments that the con-
ventional account itself facilitated and promoted.
First, critics of enumerated rights Lochnerism invert the traditional
assumption that rights with a textual basis in the Constitution stand in a supe-
rior position of legitimacy and importance to rights that do not. Lochner
itself dealt with an unenumerated constitutional right, a right that the Court
created ex nihilo insofar as the constitutional text is concerned.  The free
exercise of religion is both an enumerated constitutional right and a statu-
tory civil right.225  The rights to cost-free contraception and against discrimi-
nation championed by Sepper are (depending on what precisely
“discrimination” means) regulatory rights, statutory civil rights, or, at best, a
new set of unenumerated constitutional rights in Lochner’s own mold.  Yet by
connecting Lochner with religious free exercise—indeed, by inventing the
unheard of legal category of enumerated rights Lochnerism—Sepper shuf-
fles the hierarchy of rights and freedoms the better to suit her own prefer-
ences.  Religious freedom’s textual bases in the Constitution are irrelevant;
Sepper does not even mention them.  By creating enumerated rights
Lochnerism, Sepper can argue that religious freedom is of at best equivalent
importance to protecting individual interests in “health” and interests against
“discrimination.”  Sepper’s reframing of freedoms and rights suggests just the
sort of resource reallocation described by the first thesis of the revised
account.
Second, Sepper’s criticisms of the neutrality of the market are illuminat-
ing.  Recall that the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor embodied one of the
conventional account’s primary justifications for First Amendment freedom.
All ideas are equal from a civic perspective; all compete utterly unrestrained
and with full confidence in the Olympian neutrality of the state as to their
political virtue or vice.  The consumer is in full control of his speech; his
freedom is the freedom of market recognition conferred and guaranteed by
the state.  He changes his religion as his market tastes dictate.  Indeed, it was
the autonomized marketization of First Amendment rights that coincided
223 See id. at 1492.
224 For criticism, see for example Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Wel-
fare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 147–51 (2015).
225 True, there is disagreement about precisely what the constitutional right to religious
free exercise protects.  The rule since 1990 has been that neutral laws of general applica-
tion that have the incidental effect of burdening religious free exercise are constitutional.
But that rule is riddled with internal and external interpretive ambiguities that render it a
good deal more solicitous of religious freedom than may first appear.  For extensive discus-
sion of these ambiguities, see DEGIROLAMI, supra note 56, at 147–66.
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with and provided support for the rise of sexual autonomy and equality as a
constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment and as a civil right in
later statutes.
For Sepper, these are precisely the rights—the new civic virtues—that
need government protection from claims of First Amendment freedom
under market conditions, which are now claimed to be plainly non-neutral.
Indeed, the market “baseline” that was of such crucial normative importance
to the conventional account of the First Amendment is now intensely criti-
cized for its skewed and malign perspective on the state’s healthy role in
reallocating rights so as to further entrench the civic and social goods of sex
autonomy and equality.  First Amendment freedoms that threaten those
goods are now decried as retrogressively libertarian and immune from salu-
tary state “intervention.”  All of this is perfectly in keeping with the revised
account of the First Amendment; indeed, Sepper only really misses the mark
in identifying Lochner, rather than Terminiello or Cohen, as the true source of
the problem.
Third, Sepper’s objections to the purely voluntaristic conception of
religious freedom are another key point of contact with the revised account.
For the conventional account, the protection of individual and autonomous
choice-making and choice-changing in response to altered circumstance rep-
resents the foundation of religious freedom.  Michael Helfand has argued,
for example, that “[a]t their core, religious institutions derive their authority
from the consent of their members” and that the autonomous decisions of
individuals to join religious institutions represent the implied consent of
those individuals to abide by the chosen institutions’ rules and values.226  Yet
Sepper attacks Helfand’s position for its voluntarist perspective on religious
freedom: individuals who join religious institutions (at the very least, employ-
ees, but possibly others too) need government protection for fundamental
matters implicating “health” and “nondiscrimination.”227  It must not be
assumed that the market conditions leading to the individual’s association
with the religious institution of his own choosing were truly within the indi-
vidual’s control.  Government therefore has a role in policing that associa-
tion in order to ensure that the employee is not deprived of greater social
and political goods in sexual autonomy and equality, goods that a decent
polity must protect and that all decent individuals must want (whether they
want it or not).228  Religious institutions, per the third thesis of the revised
account, cannot be trusted not to put their religious freedom to vicious mis-
uses.  The primary loser is the corporate person of the religious institution
and those individuals who may derive a sense of social belonging by uniting
themselves to such institutions.
As noted earlier, one sees kindred arguments on the establishmentarian
side from scholars who object to the First Amendment’s ministerial excep-
226 Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?: Implied Consent and the Contraception Man-
date, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401, 417 (2013).
227 Sepper, supra note 209, at 1474.
228 See Walter Berns, Whether You Want It or Not, NAT’L REV., Oct. 10, 1975, at 1124.
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tion, albeit generally without explicit allusion to Lochner.  The ministerial
exception is illegitimate, they argue, essentially because it does not protect
autonomized religious freedom; corporate persons, whether nonprofit or
for-profit, simply have no rights to exercise religion that might be concep-
tually distinct from the autonomized claims of each of their individuated con-
stituents.229  While church-state separation must be strictly enforced when it
comes to the sensibilities of particular “reasonable observers” who are
offended by the state’s symbolic recognition of the country’s cultural connec-
tion to Christianity,230 church-state separation plays no role at all in shielding
religious groups from the government’s regulatory power to control the cleri-
cal composition of those groups.  The separation of church and state has
nothing to do with the misguided notion of church autonomy from govern-
ment regulation.231  The government, it is believed, must protect the vital
interests of dissenting members of religious organizations (members who
made the autonomous choice to associate themselves with such institutions)
against discrimination of various kinds irrespective of any religious freedom
interests at stake.232  Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to suggest that
regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex ought to be appli-
cable to all religious institutions because, by definition and self-evidently,
they do not discriminate on the basis of religious belief.233  Each of the three
theses of the revised account—the reallocation of liberty in response to the
problem of virtue and freedom, that reallocation’s patent non-neutrality, and
the coincidence and mutually reinforcing character of sexual autonomy and
equality with First Amendment autonomization—is reflected in this type of
selective separationism.
Some scholars who do not subscribe to the Lochner analogy nevertheless
make related claims in drawing a hard division between for-profit and non-
229 Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277 (2015);
Corbin, supra note 101, at 1988 (“[T]he constitutional significance of religious organiza-
tions depends upon what they can do for individuals.”).
230 The literature in support of this proposition is so voluminous as to overwhelm the
capacity of a single footnote.  For one example from a scholar who also abjures the ministe-
rial exception, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Out-
sider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545 (2010).
231 HAMILTON, supra note 101; Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church
Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225
(2007).
232 See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 994 (2013)
(objecting to Hosanna-Tabor because the Court held that “religious freedom trumps the
antidiscrimination laws” and “entitles institutions to disobey the law”).
233 Corbin, supra note 101, at 2014 (“Though it may sound counterintuitive at first,
cases in which the defendant religious organization overtly discriminates based upon relig-
ious doctrine do not implicate religious questions.  If the risk posed by a Title VII claim is
that judging whether an employment decision was based on race or sex rather than true
qualifications will require a court to determine a religious organization’s tenets and who
best embodies them, that risk disappears where the religious organization admits that sex
or race played a role.”).
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profit religious institutions.234  James Oleske, for example, has justified the
distinction on the basis of what he calls deeply “ingrained” “American”
understandings of differential religious freedom rights in the “public” and
“private” domains, a distinction between what is open and commercial versus
inherently selective, expressive, or intimate.235  Or, as James Nelson argues,
“[a]s a general matter, for-profit business norms . . . crowd out personhood
interests among participants in commercial association.  By contrast, norms
in the nonprofit sector are more hospitable to individual identification with
associations.”236  Ironically, the division of public and private has sustained a
concerted and largely successful assault from progressive legal academics as
far back as the legal realist period.  Indeed, as Morton Horwitz argues, “[t]he
first challenge to the orthodox public-private distinction emerged in pre-
cisely the same area in which it had been originally formulated—the law of
corporations.”237  Yet the logic of these seemingly contrary positions on the
public-private distinction is perfectly consistent.  Just as the public-private dis-
tinction had to be discredited in order to justify the increasing scope and
intrusiveness of regulation into what was formerly regarded as the private
domain, so must it now be reconstituted in order to protect and expand
those vital regulatory gains in the face of First Amendment challenges to new
regulatory efforts.  The conventional account of First Amendment freedom is
thus used systematically and across the decades to delimit the corporate per-
son’s assertion of First Amendment rights.  Those rights, after all, are pro-
tected solely for the sake of the “personal identification” (or what for the
conventional account was the keystone justification for First Amendment
freedom—self-realization) of those individuals who might choose them.
Thus do civic ideas of virtue and vice constantly interact with and inform
the scope of First Amendment freedom in the arguments of anti-enumerated
rights Lochnerists.  And thus do they vindicate the theses of the revised
account of the First Amendment.  To date, much of this new strain of criti-
cism has focused on the religion clauses rather than the Speech Clause.
There may be reasons for the greater vulnerability of religious freedom to
these attacks,238 but it is doubtful that those reasons will immunize freedom
of speech from it for long.  Now religious freedom is often written “religious
freedom.”239  “Free speech” may be lagging but it is not far behind.240
234 See, e.g., James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461
(2015); Oleske, supra note 9.
235 Oleske, supra note 9, at 142–46.
236 Nelson, supra note 234, at 463–64.
237 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 206
(1992) (describing the breakdown of the distinction in constitutional law).
238 See DeGirolami, supra note 102; John D. Inazu, More Is More: Strengthening Free Exer-
cise, Speech, and Association, 99 MINN. L. REV. 485, 506–22 (2014).
239 See, e.g., Monica Davey & Laurie Goodstein, Religion Laws Quickly Fall into Retreat in
Indiana and Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/
us/rights-laws-quickly-fall-into-retreat.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0; Editorial, G.O.P. Anti-
Gay Bigotry Threatens the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 12, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/opinion/sunday/gop-anti-gay-bigotry-threatens-first-
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B. Dignitarian Delimitation
A second category of judges and scholars has argued for novel and
aggressive limits on First Amendment freedom.  In several contexts, they use
the dignitarian justification for the First Amendment emphasized by the con-
ventional account to make claims about new curtailments of speech and
religious freedom.  Some of those dignitarian arguments connect directly to
the issue of sex as a civil right while others do not.241  Yet like critics of enu-
merated rights Lochnerism, these dignitarian delimiters have remembered
the problem of virtue and freedom as well.  They, too, offer some evidence in
favor of the revised account.
One of the revised account’s arguments concerned the need to make
judgments about what sort of speech was truly in the public interest.  Accord-
ing to the conventional account, the clash of self-interested market concerns
in the marketplace of ideas is the surest avenue to truth, and there is no
difference for the health of the civic polity, as far as the state is concerned,
between self-interested speech and disinterested speech—between, in
Niemeyer’s fine phrase, the speech of sinners and that of “scholars and
saints.”
In the speech context, perhaps the most important case of dignitarian
delimitation of the First Amendment by a Justice of the Supreme Court is
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United v. FEC.242  Stevens first emphasizes
that speech can in fact be regulated based on the “identity” of the speaker
and that the “Government’s interests may be more or less compelling with
respect to different classes of speakers”;243 “society could scarcely function,”
he notes, if every public interest were “an illegitimate basis for qualifying a
speaker’s autonomy.”244  He then notes that “corporations” as a class have
the “distinctive potential . . . to corrupt the electoral process” even when
corporations exercise their expressive freedom on strictly political matters.245
Citing Robert Bork (who was himself summarizing and citing to Walter
amendment.html (arguing that arguments for religious freedom are in reality “using the
idea of religious freedom as cover” for discrimination); Ashby Jones & Mark Peters, Indi-
ana Governor Wants to Clarify Religious Freedom Law, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/indiana-governor-wants-to-clarify-religious-freedom-law-1427817080;
James F. McGrath, “Religious Freedom” (with Correctly-Used Scare Quotes), PATHEOS, (Apr. 27,
2015), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/exploringourmatrix/2015/04/religious-freedom-
with-correctly-used-scare-quotes.html.
240 But see the inroads already made on several university campuses and by the likes of,
for example, Amanda Taub, The Truth About “Political Correctness” Is that It Doesn’t Actually
Exist, VOX (Jan. 28, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/28/7930845/political-
correctness-doesnt-exist.
241 As noted above, rights of sexual autonomy and equality are one particularly impor-
tant set of rights promoted by the conventional account of the First Amendment, but not
the only one.
242 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 420–21.
244 Id. at 422.
245 Id. at 423.
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Berns’s views on this precise point), Stevens emphasizes that “the Framers
and their contemporaries conceived of speech more narrowly than we now
think of it”246 and proceeds to discuss civil society’s “anti-corruption” interest
in curtailing corporate speech: “When private interests are seen to exert out-
sized control over officeholders solely on account of the money spent on (or
withheld from) their campaigns, the result can depart so thoroughly ‘from
what is pure or correct’ in the conduct of Government.”247  Finally, he
observes:
[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no
desires.  Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human
beings, to be sure, and their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fic-
tion.  But they are not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and
for whom our Constitution was established.248
That degraded constitutional status justifies degraded First Amendment pro-
tection because, as Stevens explains, regulations of corporations (or at least
those at issue in the case) cannot affect anybody’s “autonomy, dignity, or
political equality,” which are the core reasons for protecting freedom of
expression at all.249
The issue again is not the persuasiveness of Stevens’s dissent, but that it
is a near-perfect exemplar of revised account thinking.  Not all speech is
equally civic-minded; some speech is politically virtuous and other speech is
vicious.  Indeed, civil society itself would collapse if its government could not
reasonably regulate certain kinds of speech by certain actors even as to mat-
ters of political content.  Corporate speech is often vicious speech: it is a cor-
rupting and dangerous influence on the health of the democratic polity.
And, in any case, the dignitarian, autonomizing, egalitarian functions of First
Amendment speech protection that apply so forcefully to the likes of Cohen
(whose speech had no civically corrupting tendencies but represents unadul-
teratedly virtuous free speech) have no meaning for corporate persons,
which are simply a “proxy”250 for fulfilling the “self-realization”251 that is the
ultimate object of the protection of individual speech.  The state’s conferral
and recognition of the speaker’s “dignity” thus delimits the scope of the
Speech Clause.  And the corporate person, once again, is the loser.252
246 Id. at 426 (citing Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) (citing Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and
Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 SUP. CT. REV. 109)).
247 Id. at 450 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (1966)
(defining “corruption”)).
248 Id. at 466.
249 Id. at 467.
250  Id. at 466.
251  Id. (quoting Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594
(1982)).
252 See, e.g., Adam Schiff, Opinion, The Supreme Court Still Thinks Corporations Are People,
ATLANTIC (July 18, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-
supreme-court-still-thinks-corporations-are-people/259995/; Editorial, The Court’s Blow to
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL408.txt unknown Seq: 49 11-MAY-16 10:00
2016] virtue,  freedom,  and  the  first  amendment 1513
Several scholars have also taken up arguments for dignitarian delimita-
tion in other Speech Clause contexts.  Alexander Tsesis, for example, has
recently argued that free speech rights should be subject to a “balanc[ing]”
approach in which courts measure the speech rights against competing
“social values of equality, dignity, creativity, and public peace.”253  Speech
protection, Tsesis argues, must be linked specifically to “the broader constitu-
tional value of equal dignity secured by a system of government whose aim
should be the common good,”254 that is, within the context of “other consti-
tutional interests.”255  When it comes to defining what the “common good”
demands with respect to speech limitation, Tsesis mentions vague interests in
“national normativity,” “the regulatory needs of civil society,” and “the princi-
ple of liberal equality,” but he later notes that corporate speech does not
serve the same dignitarian ends as speech that “giv[es] each person the abil-
ity to assert her self-identity as an autonomous being and a member of a
deliberative society.”256
Likewise, Andrew Koppelman invokes the conventional account’s first
justification for free speech—the promotion of civic and political delibera-
tion—to argue that “revenge pornography” (“the online posting of sexually
explicit photographs without the subject’s consent”) should be categorically
excepted from First Amendment protection.257  He claims that if the goal of
free speech protection is the formation of “a citizenry with the confidence to
participate in public discussion,” then revenge pornography is harmful to
that interest because “[t]raumatized, stigmatized women are not the kind of
people that a free speech regime aims to create.”258  Though Koppelman
does not use the word “dignity,” his arguments for First Amendment limita-
tion in this context depend on a highly autonomized conception that prizes
the Millian character ideal of a virtuous liberal society—that “[e]very individ-
ual has an obligation to respond to an inwardly felt calling, which if coura-
geously pursued will bring him closer to the ultimate good.”259  And there is
a “tight causal connection” between revenge pornography and the harm of
obstructing this character ideal.260
It is interesting that Koppelman does not extend the claim to pornogra-
phy proper, which arguably inflicts many of the same harms on women’s dig-
nity and equality, albeit perhaps in a slightly less tightly causally connected
way.  But it is not surprising in light of the tension that he, like the ACLU
lawyers of Wheeler’s account before him, must negotiate between what are
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/
22fri1.html.
253 Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2016).
254 Id. at 20.
255 Id. at 24.
256 Id. at 29, 53.
257 Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY
L.J. 661, 661 (2016).
258 Id. at 663.
259 Id. at 680.
260 Id. at 686.
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felt to be the important gains in constitutional and other rights of sexual
freedom (which were themselves achieved through operation of the
autonomized First Amendment) and the primacy of rights of sexual equality.
As Koppelman peremptorily declares, “our ideal is an egalitarian one.”261
Where he derives the notion that the single ideal animating American consti-
tutionalism is egalitarian is a mystery; he simply announces it.  And yet
whether the civic ideal he champions is successful depends on the character
of the people constituting the republic.  The Supreme Court has proceeded
in “blissful ignorance” of these arguments in promoting pornography in the
name of free expression and in “casting aside, as so many irrational encum-
brances, the conventions of decency that used to govern public discourse.”262
It is rather late in the day to reverse course, particularly in the sort of partial
and fecklessly half-hearted fashion Koppelman proposes.  Nevertheless, the
basic structure of Koppelman’s arguments for First Amendment curtailment
reflects the theses of the revised account much more closely than those of the
conventional account.  He has remembered the problem of virtue and free-
dom (surely he had never forgotten it), and is reallocating First Amendment
freedom accordingly.263
One final group of dignitarian delimiters deserves to be mentioned:
those who argue that religious accommodations that impose substantial or
significant harms on identifiable third parties violate the Establishment
Clause.264  The catalyst for an assertion of third-party harms as independent
grounds for an Establishment Clause claim in a case like Hobby Lobby was the
government’s assumption of power to mandate the cost-free provision of con-
traceptive coverage by private employers.  Once it did that, the non-receipt of
cost-free contraceptive coverage could be restyled by the theory’s exponents
as the deprivation of an “entitlement” and the shifting of a “burden” to a
261 Id. at 687.
262 BERNS, FAFAD, supra note 108, at 232.  See also the extensive criticisms of pornogra-
phy by third-wave feminists including Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.
ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW
DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY (1988); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THE-
ORY OF THE STATE (1989).
263 See also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2645869 (arguing that
the harms caused by the First Amendment freedom of speech, and especially harms result-
ing from revenge pornography, must be balanced against the consequentialist benefits of
freedom of speech).
264 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an
Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51
(2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contra-
ception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343 (2014); Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
25 (2015); Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, The Establishment
Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html.
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third party.265  And resistance to the government’s distension of its powers
on the ground that it violates a statutory claim of religious freedom is itself
unconstitutional.
Third-party-harms theorists are not always clear about which sorts of
harms rise to the level of substantiality or significance.  But one sort of harm
that unquestionably does seem to meet the standard is the injury to individ-
ual dignity that attaches to persons who are denied cost-free contraceptive
coverage by their employer on the basis of religious objections, because what
attends those objections is a judgment about the immorality of certain sexual
behavior.  Thus, for example, Reva Siegel and Douglas Nejaime write that
these sorts of denials, and their accommodation through law, are deeply inju-
rious to individual dignity because they “stigmatize and demean” those whose
own sexual morality deviates from “traditional morality.”266  The feeling of
being “judged” by those who raise religious objections to certain conduct,
and the indignity of knowing that the state has countenanced that judgment
by permitting a religious accommodation, are independent harms affecting
the sexual autonomy and equality of the listener.267  Indeed, these harms are
so serious that accommodating any contrary religious interest might itself be
a violation of the First Amendment.
In concluding this Part, it may be worth simply recalling some of the
basic claims of the revised account: All First Amendment freedom—whether
of speech or religious exercise—that anybody might want to regulate imposes
harms on third parties.268  The harm is not mitigated by assurances that the
hearer need not agree; it is consummated in the act of expression itself and
the hearer’s internalization of it.  The expression that any society elects not
to protect reflects what it believes is unendurably vicious (or “substantially”
“harmful”).  The First Amendment’s autonomization—its increasing depen-
dence on arguments from individual “recognition,” self-realization, marke-
tization, and egalitarianism of self-expression—have helped to generate,
reinforce, and even constitutionalize rights in sexual autonomy, dignity, and
equality.  Those rights now stand as bedrock principles of the Constitution.
Indeed, claims of religious liberty that are believed to threaten them are now
said to be violations of the First Amendment itself; dignitarian delimitation of
religious freedom, when it serves the ends that third-party-harms theorists
have in mind for it, is in consequence required by the First Amendment.
To this point, the Supreme Court has been largely unmoved by these
scholarly criticisms and proposals to curtail freedom of speech and religion.
And yet, as Berns observed, “Civil society is impossible if every man retains an
265 Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 264, at 59–60 (“Common sense tells us that a
RFRA exemption of Hobby Lobby from the Mandate deprives employees of a valuable
legal entitlement.”).
266 Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims
in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2548, 2576 (2015).
267 Id. at 2576–77.
268 See supra Section II.A.
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absolute freedom” of expression.269  If the Court is true both to the
autonomized First Amendment and to the rights of sexual liberty and equal-
ity that it has created and installed at the foundation of the Constitution, it at
least ought to confront them.  Perhaps it even ought to accept them.
CONCLUSION
Why is freedom good?  It is good if the ends it promotes are good.270
Once we accept that response, the path is open to explore those ends—ends
that neither begin nor end with indefinitely expanding rights of sexual
autonomy and equality.  The Supreme Court’s more particular answers to the
question of the ends of free speech and religious exercise over the past cen-
tury have transformed American society—even as the Court and many in the
academy have emphatically denied that it was answering the question at all.
The political morality that the autonomized First Amendment has facilitated,
promoted, and entrenched is not neutral on the question of virtue and vice.
It is neck deep in it.  The Court’s doctrine reflects specific and highly partial
views of virtue and vice whose effect has been to educate and form the char-
acter of American citizens—to move American political mores away from one
set of basic commitments and toward another.  There is therefore no com-
pletely libertarian First Amendment, no plausible account of it that expands
and maximizes liberty of speech and religious exercise for everybody—for all
people and groups.  There is only the society that America was before the rise
of the conventional account of the First Amendment, and the society it is
becoming after it.  For the “problem we have discussed in these pages is not
really the problem of [freedom] at all; it is the problem of virtue.”271
269 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 252.
270 See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996).
271 BERNS, FVFA, supra note 108, at 255.
